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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings.

Respondent, Leila Brauner ("Mrs. Brauner") generally agrees with Defendant/Appellant
AHC OF BOISE, LLC, dba Aspen Transition Rehab's ("Aspen") statement of the nature of this
case. The case arises from a claim of medical malpractice arising out of Aspen's care and
treatment of Mrs. Brauner, specifically the failure to contact the attending physician or the
treating orthopedic surgeon and/or the failure to send Mrs. Brauner to the emergency department
no later than 3 :41 AM on March 17, 2014 based on the clear distress Mrs. Brauner was suffering.
This distress was caused by a severed artery in Mrs. Brauner' s right leg and the delay in sending
Mrs. Brauner to the emergency department was a substantial factor in causing the amputation of
Mrs. Brauner's right leg at the mid-thigh.
Although irrelevant to the appeal, Aspen asserts that certain documents from Mrs.
Brauner were never "provided to the Trial Court." See Appellant's Brief, p. 3. Mrs. Brauner
strongly disputes this accusation and notes that the trial court specifically referenced the
affidavits filed in opposition to the Rule 60(b)(3) motion and never indicated it had not received
and reviewed Mrs. Brauner' s briefing on that issue. See July 1 1th hearing Transcript, p. 100, LL
18-19; 86, LL 5-12. Furthermore, the trial court heard oral argument about Mr. Gunn's Affidavit
and Ms. Nielsen's affidavit in which multiple references to both documents were made by both
parties and the trial court never indicated it did not have those documents. See generally July
11 th Transcript, p. 102-140; see also R. 2882. Thus, whatever issues may have arisen with the
official inclusion of the documents in the district court record, it is clear that these documents
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were provided to the trial court. Aspen admits that the documents are also now part of the record
on appeal. Thus, Aspen's recitation of this issue is clearly for no purpose other than to cast
additional irresponsible aspersions at Mrs. Brauner' s counsel.
B.

Statement of Facts

Mrs. Brauner greatly disputes Aspen's Statement of Facts and procedural history
primarily because many of the facts within that statement are presented as facts when, in fact,
they are supposition, innuendo, and accusations 1• Due to size constraints on the briefing in this
matter, Mrs. Brauner cannot refute every misstatement and accusation made by Aspen in a
separate section of this brief and has, instead, addressed the most egregious and most relevant of
them within the substantive arguments offered in this brief. Mrs. Brauner' s statement of facts is
offered to provide the Court context when addressing Aspen's claim of evidentiary errors by the
trial court.
Mrs. Brauner has knee replacement surgery and resides at Aspen for rehabilitation.

As Aspen acknowledges in its brief and was undisputed at trial, Mrs. Brauner had a total
right knee replacement surgery performed by Richard Moore, M.D. on February 18, 2014. After
three days in the rehabilitation unit at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Brauner
was transferred to Aspen for further in-patient rehabilitation. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4. On
March 3, 2014, Mrs. Brauner had a follow-up appointment with Dr. Moore which included a

Mrs. Brauner notes at the outset the irony of Aspen attempting to portray Mrs. Brauner as being
guilty of serial discovery violations and providing deficient expert disclosures. The reality of
this case is that it was Aspen who had two experts excluded for failure to provide proper expert
disclosures. R. 522-523. Further, it was Aspen who disclosed vital medical records just days
before trial. R. 727-734; Tr., 126-130.
1
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review of x-rays of the right leg. It is undisputed that the x-ray revealed a femoral fracture which
Dr. Moore did not identify. Tr., 716:4-21.

Mrs. Brauner's condition changes dramatically on Marclt 16, 2014.
Throughout her stay at Aspen, Mrs. Brauner made very slow progress m her
rehabilitation.

Aspen's medical director, Jason Ludwig, D.O., testified that it was not

uncommon for a patient to take an extended period of time to recover from knee replacement
surgery. Tr., 630:12-15. Mrs. Brauner's nursing expert, Cheryl Fabello, testified that on March
14, 2014, Mrs. Brauner complained of significant pain and was given additional pain medication.
Tr., 450:4 - 451:25. On March 15, 2014 at 4:33 AM, the nursing note indicated, for the first
time, that Mrs. Brauner was showing signs of confusion. Tr., 452:20 - 453:19.
At 3:03 AM on March 16, 2014, Mrs. Brauner was noted to be alert, with noticeable
confusion and confusion that increased as the night went on. Tr., 456:8-17. The nursing notes
further reflect that Mrs. Brauner was asking for more pain medication. Tr., 459:10 - 460:1. The
nursing notes further reflect that Mrs. Brauner' s right foot was curled inward and appeared
flaccid. Tr., 460:2-6. Ms. Fabello testified that these observations were problematic and should
have been red flags for a serious problem. Tr., 461 :23 - 462: 10. Ms. Fabello testified that the
nurses should have alerted the attending doctor of the situation at that time. Tr., 462:21 - 463: 17.
The nurses notes at 2:15 PM on March 16, 2014 indicate that Mrs. Brauner was drowsy and
refusing to get out of bed for toileting. Tr., 465: 15 - 466: 11. The nurses note further indicated
that her right ankle was now rotated outwards. Tr., 466: 12-17. The notes also indicate that Mrs.
Brauner refused repositioning of the foot and was now requiring catheterization for urination.
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Tr., 467:8-22. Ms. Fabello testified a physician should have been called at this time. Tr., 467:23
- 468:5.
A vitals report was taken at 12:20 AM on March 17, 2014 reporting Mrs. Brauner's pulse
at 126 bpm. Tr., 475:3-12. Prior to this, her heartrate had typically been around 72 bpm. Tr.,
475:10-12. There is no evidence this was ever reported to anyone, and the attending nurse
testified he was unaware of that report. Tr., 475:24 - 476:3. The next nursing assessment was
performed at 3:41 AM on March 17, 2014. The nurses note states that Mrs. Brauner was alert,
but very confused, attempting to get out of bed and pushing the CNA away. Tr., 468:21-25. The
nursing note further states that Mrs. Brauner had very tight edema after presenting with only
trace edema just two days earlier. Tr., 469:25 - 470:3. Lastly, the note indicates that Mrs.
Brauner was in severe pain, stating she had never had this much pain before and telling the nurse
to "just shoot me." Tr., 471:12-21. Ms. Fabello testified that the nurse should have immediately
contacted the physician. Tr., 472: 17-22.
The final assessment was performed at 5 :28 AM. At that time, the nurse documented that
the right lower extremity was cold to the touch, the skin is pale, and there is no pedal pulse. Tr.,
473:5-23. The note reflects that Mrs. Brauner is now insisting on being taken to the emergency
department. Tr., 476:4-15. Eventually, she was taken to the emergency department but it was too
late to avoid amputation of her right leg. Ms. Fabello testified that Aspen's failure to contact a
physician as Mrs. Brauner's condition deteriorated up to and including the assessment at 3:41
AM on March 17, 2014 was not just a deviation from the local standard of care, but was, in fact,
reckless conduct. Tr., 476:16-477:22.
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Dr. Ludwig and Dr. Moore testify that if contacted by Aspen nurses, they would have sent Mrs.
Brauner to the emergency department.
At trial of this matter, Mrs. Brauner called Dr. Ludwig to testify in her case in chief. Tr.,
617. Dr. Ludwig was disclosed as a percipient, non-retained expert witness within the Amended
Disclosure of Expert Witnesses on November 9, 2017. R. 208. Aspen did not offer an objection
to Dr. Ludwig's testimony prior to Dr. Ludwig taking the stand. Tr., 617. Dr. Ludwig was a
certified medical director and was the medical director at Aspen in March of 2014. Tr., 619-620.
At the time of trial, Dr. Ludwig was still Aspen's medical director. Tr., 623:13-15. While
testifying, Dr. Ludwig was asked what he would have done if contacted by Aspen nurses on
March 16th or 17th regarding Mrs. Brauner's deteriorating condition. Tr., 647-655. Dr. Ludwig
testified he would have told the nurses to call Dr. Moore or referred Mrs. Brauner to the
emergency department. See id. Aspen did not raise any objection to this testimony based upon
Dr. Ludwig's expert witness disclosure. See id.
Following Dr. Ludwig, Dr. Moore was called to the stand to testify. When Mrs.
Brauner's counsel began asking Dr. Moore about her condition on March 16th and 17th , Aspen's
counsel offered the following objection: "I'll object to his question and line of questioning, based
on Rule 16 and 26 regarding disclosure." Tr., 721:8-10; Tr., 722:13-26. This is the very first
time any objection was offered regarding Dr. Moore's testimony with a reference to Rule 16 or
Rule 26 disclosures. The trial court overruled the objection. Tr., 721: 12. Aspen did not request a
sidebar or argument before the Court to demonstrate the lack of disclosure of Dr. Moore's
opinions. See id. Later, Mrs. Brauner's counsel asked Dr. Moore what he would have done had
he been contacted by the Aspen nurses in the early morning of March 17, 2014. Tr., 723-724.
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Aspen's counsel offered no objection to this question. Tr., 723-724. Dr. Moore testified that he
would have referred Mrs. Brauner to the emergency department. Tr., 723-724.
Both Mrs. Brauner's and Aspen's retained vascular experts testify to causation.

At trial, Mrs. Brauner offered the testimony of Michael Tullis, M.D., a board-certified
vascular surgeon. Tr., 552:25 - 553:1; 555:3-20. Dr. Tullis testified that if a vascular surgeon
can perform surgery within a six-hour window after transection of the superficial femoral artery,
there is a strong likelihood of recovery for the patient. Tr., 559: 18-23. Dr. Tullis testified that,
to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the transection of the artery occurred between
midnight and 3:41 AM on March 17, 2014. Tr., 569: 19 - 570:16; Tr., 572:6-18. Dr. Tullis then
testified that had Mrs. Brauner been transferred to the emergency department even as late as 3 :41
AM on March 17, 2014, her injury would have been diagnosed and treated and the leg saved. Tr.,
582:19 - 583:5. Lastly, Dr. Tullis testified that to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the

delay in sending Mrs. Brauner to the emergency department was a substantial factor in causing
an irreversible vascular injury and, consequently, the amputation of her leg. Tr., 588:23 - 589:8.
Aspen's retained vascular surgeon, Benjamin Brooke, M.D., also testified that he
believed the leg was still viable as of 5:28 AM (which necessarily means it was viable at 3:41
AM); and had the surgery happened at or near that time, Mrs. Brauner would not have lost her
leg. Tr., 1487:18 - 1488:10.
Michele Nielsen (later Cook) testifies to Mrs. Brauner's damages.

On February 19, 2018, during trial of this matter, Aspen brought two motions with
regards to Mrs. Brauner's retained life-care plan expert, Michele Nielsen. First, Aspen moved to
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strike the Second Nielsen Report, served on February 12, 2018, on the grounds it was untimely
disclosed. R. 888-894. Aspen also moved to partially exclude Ms. Nielsen's testimony on the
grounds that Ms. Nielsen lacked foundation for her certain opinions. R. 882-887, 895-897.
The trial court deferred consideration of foundational issues until foundational testimony
was heard and then permitted Ms. Nielsen to testify. Tr., 796:16-21; 801:6-9. The trial court
heard Ms. Nielsen's testimony regarding the foundation for her reports, specifically
conversations with Mrs. Brauner's treating providers, and overruled Aspen's objections to the
testimony. Tr., 814:11-815:23; 817:6-819:2 (further foundation laid, and Aspen's objection
overruled, regarding independent living facility medical expenses). The trial court admitted the
Second Nielsen Report as Plaintiffs Exhibit 50, over Aspen's foundational objection. Tr.,
827:13-19.
The Jury's Verdict and Post-Trial Proceedings
After hearing testimony for nearly two weeks, the jury returned a verdict in this matter
awarding Mrs. Brauner $1,132,602.00 in economic damages and $1,132,602.00 in non-economic
damages. See R. 1005. Following the reading of the verdict, the trial court entered judgment on
March 9, 2018. R. 1166-67. On March 30, 2018, Aspen filed, under seal, a Motion for Relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3). R. 2599. Within the Memorandum in Support to that Motion, Aspen
alleged, for the very first time, the existence of a secret quid pro quo agreement between Dr.
Moore and Mrs. Brauner' s counsel that required Dr. Moore to testify adversely to Aspen in
exchange for settling the case against him. R., p. 2599-2600. In response to this motion, Mrs.
Brauner filed, among other things, Affidavits of Eric S. Rossman and Kevin Scanlan (counsel for
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Dr. Moore) and the Declaration of Dr. Moore. R. 1480-1485; 1487-1495; 1516-1518. Each of
these documents clearly state that no agreement, quid pro quo or otherwise, ever existed that
conditioned the settlement between Dr. Moore and Mrs. Brauner on any testimony by Dr. Moore.
See id. The trial court heard argument on the Rule 60(6)(3) motion on July 11, 2018. See July

11, 2018 Transcript, p. 11, LL 6-12. The trial court denied the motion from the bench that same
day. Tr., 100-101.

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
A. Is Plaintiff/Respondent entitled to attorney fees on appeal unde1· Idaho Code §
12-121?

Whether Mrs. Brauner is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121
and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.

III. ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the judgment entered by the trial court on March 9, 2018.
Aspen's issues on appeal are entirely issues which were committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, properly explored by the trial court, and properly denied. The trial court correctly
determined that Michele Nielsen's life care plan and associated testimony did not lack
foundation and that the February 12, 2018 life care plan was an appropriate illustrative exhibit.
Similarly, the trial court properly admitted Dr. Moore' s testimony at trial, correctly refused
Aspen's attempt to introduce the fact of settlement, and appropriately denied Aspen's Rule
60(6)(3) motion.
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A.

Standard of Review.

As Aspen recognizes, an abuse of discretion standard applies to all issues currently before
this Court on appeal. See Appellant 's Brief, Sec. Ill - Standards of Review, p. 19-21.
The abuse of discretion test requires a four-part analysis 2 : "Whether the trial court: (1)
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 , 421 P.3d 187,194 (2018). The abuse of discretion standard of review is a
deferential one. See, e.g., Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 459, 197 P.3d 310, 320 (2008)
("Because the magistrate made such extensive findings and the abuse of discretion standard is
very deferential . . ." (emphasis added)).
Significantly, this Court has made it clear that discretion is not abused simply because
other jurists could reach a different decision; because the inquiry is not "whether we would have
reached a different conclusion .... " Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods. , Inc. , 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67
P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). "Simply showing that the district court could have decided differently in
no way evinces an abuse of discretion standard for a proper appeal." Estate of Ekic v. Geico
lndem. Co. , 163 Idaho 895,899,422 P.3d 1101 , 1105 (2018) (emphasis added).

We take this occasion to clarify that even though this test has been enumerated in three subparts
for over thirty years, it is actually a four-part standard, requiring trial courts to do the four things
set forth above in exercising their discretion. By making this correction we are not altering the
substance of the test; we simply take this opportunity to clarify what has previously been a
compound second sentence -- which actually requires two separate things, that a trial judge act
both 1) within the boundaries of her or his discretion; and 2) consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to the judge. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho
856, 863-864, 421 P.3d 187, 194-195 (2018).
2
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B.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Aspen's Motion to Exclude Portions of
Michele Nielsen's Testimony and Properly Admitted the February 12, 2018
Life Care Plan as an Illustrative Exhibit.

Aspen appeals three discretionary decisions rendered by the trial court with regards to the
reports, testimony, and file and/or "notes" of Michele Nielsen (later Michele Cook), Mrs.
Brauner' s life-care planning expert witness who testified at trial regarding the cost of Mrs.
Brauner's future medical care: (1) the trial court's denial of Aspen's February 19, 2018 motion to
partially exclude Ms. Nielsen's testimony on foundational grounds (Appellant's Brief, 29-36);
(2) the trial court's denial of Aspen's February 19, 2018 motion to strike Ms. Nielsen's
supplemental report (Appellant's Brief, 36-41); and (3) the trial court's consideration of the issue
of the production of Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" (Appellant's Brief, 41-51 ).
In rendering these discretionary decisions, the trial court did not abuse its "broad
discretion in deciding whether to admit expert testimony." Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v.

Egbert, 125 Idaho 678, 680, 873 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1994). Aspen consistently failed to assert its
available remedies to its own detriment, but now seeks to blame Mrs. Brauner for its own failure
to raise issues in a timely manner such that they could be fully and fairly addressed by the trial
court. The instances in which Aspen had the opportunity, but failed, to raise issues regarding Ms.
Nielsen that were finally raised for the first time in the middle of trial on February 19, 2018 are
numerous. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and course of trial preparation demanded by
scheduling orders entered pursuant to Rule 16 thereof demand litigants be proactive in preparing
their case and addressing known discovery and evidentiary issues, an obligation Aspen
repeatedly failed to satisfy. Aspen's failures, however, are not the fault of Mrs. Brauner or the
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trial court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion with regards to its Nielsen rulings in any
manner, and Aspen's wholly frivolous appeal with regards to these issues should be denied.
1.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Aspen's
Motion to Partially Exclude Ms. Nielsen on Foundational Grounds,
nor in Overruling Aspen's Foundational Objections to Ms. Nielsen's
Trial Testimony.

Aspen first argues that Ms. Nielsen lacked foundation to testify regarding "the
foundational link between the costs she had collected for future cares and the reasonable medical
necessity of these costs as a function of Plaintiffs amputation." Appellant's Brief, 29. Ms.
Nielsen testified extensively at both her deposition and at trial regarding her expertise,
experience, methodology, and the medical necessity opinions of Mrs. Brauner's treating
providers upon which she relied in forming her opinions. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Aspen's foundational objections to Ms. Nielsen's testimony and opinions.
After stipulated extensions of disclosure deadlines (R. 889), Mrs. Brauner timely
disclosed her experts on November 6, 2017 pursuant to Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. R. 101-191. 3 Mrs. Brauner disclosed Ms. Nielsen as a retained expert to provide
opinions at trial regarding a life care plan she created evidencing the cost of Mrs. Brauner's
future medical needs. R. 114-115. Ms. Nielsen's first written report, dated January 27, 2017, was
disclosed as part of Mrs. Brauner's November 6, 2017 expert disclosure ("First Nielsen Report").
R. 159-165. The First Nielsen Report opined that Mrs. Brauner's medical damages totaled

Aspen, as it frequently has in this matter both below and on appeal, makes a demonstrably false,
accusatory factual assertion that Mrs. Brauner's initial expert disclosure was untimely. See
Appellant's Brief, 22; compare R. 889 ("However, at Plaintiffs request, Defendants stipulated to
an extended deadline of November 6, 2017.").
3
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$1,366,749.00: $547,850.00 m past medical expenses and $818,899.00 m future medical
expenses. R. 161-165.
On December 20, 2017 Aspen timely disclosed its expert witnesses. R. 260-320. Aspen
disclosed Nancy Collins, Ph.D, for the purpose of rebutting Ms. Nielsen's life care plan and
opinions regarding Mrs. Brauner's future medical needs, though Dr. Collins' expert disclosure
was exceedingly general and limited in its scope and included no written report. R. 293-296.
As trial neared and in accordance with the trial court's scheduling order, both parties filed
motions in limine. R. 521. Mrs. Brauner filed extensive motions, both of a general trial nature (R.
244-255) and specifically regarding Aspen's disclosure of its expert witnesses (R. 215-243),
thereby affording the trial court a fair opportunity to consider, with the benefit of full briefing by
the parties, the adequacy of the disclosed opinions and the foundation, or lack thereof, supporting
such opinions. Aspen did not file a motion in limine seeking to exclude Ms. Nielsen on
foundational grounds. On January 16, 2018 the trial court heard oral argument regarding the
parties' motions in limine. The trial court denied Mrs. Brauner' s motion in limine seeking
exclusion of Dr. Collins. R. 523, but granted Mrs. Brauner's motion to exclude other experts.
Ms. Nielsen disclosed a second written report on February 12, 2018 (the "Second Nielsen
Report"). R. 2016-2022. Notably, the Second Nielsen Report reduced its damages calculation to
$1 ,132,602.00: $298,125.52 in past medical expenses (in accordance with the trial court's
pretrial ruling regarding use of paid, as opposed to billed, medical expenses) and future medical
expenses presently valued at $834,477.00 by Dr. Walter Lierman, Mrs. Brauner's retained
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economist. R. 2024-2047. The Second Nielsen Report thus supported a reduction in damages in
the amount of $234,147.00 from the First Nielsen Report's total damages of $1,366,749.00.
Aspen objected to Ms. Nielsen's opinions for the first time on February 19, 2018, in the
middle of trial and the day before Ms. Nielsen was to testify. Aspen moved to strike the Second
Nielsen Report as untimely disclosed. R. 888-894. Aspen also moved to partially exclude Ms.
Nielsen's testimony on the grounds that:
(1) the medical interventions she claims are necessary have been employed by
Plaintiff and have been found to be beneficial; (2) that all of the anticipated future
costs incurred are directly related to the alleged amputation; and (3) that a
qualified physician, psychologist or expert in the physical therapy field has opined
or testified that the costs are due to the amputation and will be necessarily
incurred at some point in the future.
R. 882-887, 895-897.
As a threshold matter, it should be noted that Aspen failed to bring a motion in limine
seeking to exclude Ms. Nielsen from testifying on foundational grounds. Admittedly, Mrs.
Brauner did not object to Aspen's February 19, 2018 motions regarding Ms. Nielsen on the
grounds that Aspen waived such arguments because it failed to bring a motion in limine. This
Court, however, should strongly consider Aspen's failure to bring a motion in limine within the
time periods set by the trial court when considering whether the trial court abused its discretion
in ruling against Aspen's foundational objections to Ms. Nielsen's testimony. A timely filed
motion in limine allows the parties to fully brief an issue, which in turn allows a trial court to
reach a carefully reasoned decision regarding critical evidentiary issues. By contrast, as the
record in this case plainly demonstrates, a party that ignores a motion in limine deadline and
objects to foundational qualifications of a timely-disclosed expert witness, an issue ideally suited
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to pretrial resolution via motion in limine and raises such objections for the first time in the
middle of trial places an unfair and prejudicial burden on the opposing party who cannot brief the
issue, as well as the trial court which must make a snap decision on the bench with the jury in the
jury room and limited trial time available. Aspen's willful ignorance of the motion in limine
deadline and manner in which it placed the issue of foundation supporting Ms. Nielsen's
opinions before the trial court should be strongly considered by this Court in determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion in this case.
Substantively, the First Nielsen Report disclosed the medical foundation of her opinions
set forth therein: "I spoke with Mrs. Brauner's primary care provider, Scott Bressler, MD, on
1/17/17. He concurs with the future medical care listed below." R. 160. The Second Nielsen
Report states that Ms. Nielsen "spoke by telephone with Dr. Bressler on 1/17/17 and with Dr.
Hirose on 1/29/18." R. 2016. Aspen nonetheless inexplicably argues that "there was no disclosed
foundational support for [Nielsen's] opinions at all." Appellant's Brief, 30. Aspen, however,
recognizes that the trial court said it would consider whether Ms. Nielsen's testimony was
supported by adequate foundation based on her trial testimony: "I'll simply take up at the time
that the questions are asked, whether there has been an adequate foundation established."
Appellant's Brief, 30 (quoting Tr., 796:19-21).

Aspen first cites this Court's decision in Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Egbert, 125
Idaho 678, 680, 873 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1994), in arguing that Ms. Nielsen lacked the requisite
"experience and expertise" to testify regarding Mrs. Brauner' s damages. Appellant's Brief, 31. In
Lumbermens, this Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
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an insurance claims supervisor to "present testimony and an exhibit to estimate SIF's future
liability for medical and disability benefits to Austin and to establish SIF's 'damages' arising out
of this claim." 125 Idaho at 679-80, 873 P.2d at 1334. The trial court "believed there must be
proper evidence of Austin's permanent disability and unemployability before it would be
appropriate to consider the claim's supervisor's estimate of SIF's future liability for the claim."
Id. at 680, 873 P.2d at 1334.
Lumbermens is readily distinguishable. First, unlike this case, the trial court did not allow

the expert to testify, and this Court, recognizing the trial court's broad discretion regarding the
admission of expert testimony, did not disturb its exercise of such discretion. Second, this Court
recognized that if it was undisputed that the claimant was disabled, "it was ordinary and
justifiable for the claims supervisor to rely on the claims file, including medical reports and
evaluations contained in the file, in determining workers' compensation disability and estimating
SIF's future liability." Id. at 680, 873 P.2d at 1334. The claimant's disability, however, was not
undisputed and this Court logically ruled that the claims supervisor was not "competent to
resolve, in the first instance, the disputed issue of whether Austin was fully medically disabled.
That determination must be made by competent medical testimony ... The claims supervisor was
not competent to testify as to medical condition .... " Id. Thus, Lumbermens actually supports
the premise that Ms. Nielsen, like the claims supervisor in that case, is competent to testify,
based on her experience and training as a life care planner, regarding damages once the injury
and disability at issue have been established by competent medical opinions.
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In this case, as was discussed in the Statement of Facts, Michael Tullis, MD, a timely and
properly disclosed expert witness for Mrs. Brauner, opined that the delay in Mrs. Brauner's
treatment caused by Aspen was a substantial factor in causing Mrs. Brauner's irreparable
vascular injury and amputation. Tr., 588:23-589:11. Lumbermens thus supports the trial court's
decision in this case rather than undermining it, because Ms. Nielsen only opined regarding
damages after Mrs. Brauner' s disability and the cause thereof was established through competent
medical testimony.
Next, Aspen cites a number of out of jurisdiction cases for the premise that life care plans
must be supported by medical recommendations. Appellant's Brief, 31-32. Aspen then cites more
out of jurisdiction authority supporting the premise that an expert cannot simply "parrot" the
opinions of other experts. Appellant's Brief, 33-34. Utilizing these two premises, Aspen takes the
position that the Court abused its discretion in permitting Ms. Nielsen to testify because
the Trial Court did not indicate that it had considered [Ms. Nielsen's] expertise or
Drs. Hirose and Bressler's review of [Ms. Nielsen's] conclusion, or wonder how
they might be qualified. Further, this type of expert-witness parroting should not
be permitted. By permitting Plaintiff to use [Ms. Nielsen] as a conduit for the
purported out-of-court opinions of Dr. Bressler and Dr. Hirose, the Trial Court
deprived Aspen of its right to cross-examination and effectively nullified the
foundational and disclosure requirements of IRCP 26 and IRE 702.

Appellant's Brief, 35.
Aspen ignores the record in arguing that Ms. Nielsen's expertise and experience were
not established. Mrs. Brauner's expert disclosure described Ms. Nielsen's extensive history and
experience as a life care planner; Ms. Nielsen's CV disclosed that she is a Registered Nurse with
a Master's Degree and is a Certified Case Manager, Certified Rehabilitation Counselor, Certified

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 16

Occupational Health Nurse - Specialist, Certified Professional Disability Manager, and Certified
Life Care Planner. R. 165. Aspen explored Ms. Nielsen's qualifications and experience in her
deposition. R. 1891-1897; 1914-1922. Ms. Nielsen testified extensively at trial regarding her
qualifications, experience, and expertise, which was subject to cross-examination by Aspen. Tr.,
806:22-810:14. Aspen brought no motion in limine questioning Ms. Nielsen's qualifications,
experience and expertise as a life care planner. Thus, the trial Court did not abuse its discretion
in deeming Ms. Nielsen qualified to testify as an expert life care planner at trial.
Regarding Ms. Nielsen's alleged "parroting" of the opinions of Dr. Bressler and Dr.
Hirose, Aspen betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. Mrs. Brauner does not contend that Ms. Nielsen is qualified to offer medical causation
opinions, but Ms. Nielsen may permissibly rely on facts and data customarily relied upon by life
care planners in forming her opinions:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has
been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field
would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion or
inference on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be
admitted ... .
Idaho R. Evid. 703.
By contrast, "parroting" occurs when an expert offers an opinion without a basis to do so
and simply because another expert issued the opinion, and the non-qualified expert testifies that
the opinion in question is actually their own. For example, a general family practice doctor
providing causation opinions regarding an injury caused by an advanced brain tumor that were
originated by an oncology specialist. Often this practice occurs when an expert witness who
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would offer critical opinions at trial is excluded, and a party attempts to circumvent the exclusion
by having a non-qualified expert simply repeat, or "parrot" the critical, but excluded, opinion of
the qualified expert. The key is the non-qualified expert holding the opinion in question as their
own, despite the lack of qualifications to render it. See, e.g., Eberli v. Cirrus Design Corp., 615
F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1364 (S. D. Fla. 2009) ("There is a distinction, which is applicable here,
between an expert basing his independent opinions upon hearsay and otherwise inadmissible
evidence, and an expert merely parroting the expert opinion of another. Whereas the former is
contemplated and permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the latter is strictly
forbidden.").
Ms. Nielsen did not engage in "parroting" because she never testified that she personally
held or formed opinions regarding the medical necessity of Mrs. Brauner's future care. Rather,
Ms. Nielsen consistently testified that she relied upon the medical opinions of Dr. Bressler and
Dr. Hirose regarding the necessity of Mrs. Brauner's future medical needs in forming her life
care plan, as explicitly contemplated by Rule 703. The First Nielsen Report disclosed that Ms.
Nielsen "spoke with Mrs. Brauner's primary care provider, Scott Bressler, MD, on 1/17/17. He
concurs with the future medical care listed below." R. 160. The Second Nielsen report states that
Ms. Nielsen "spoke by telephone with Dr. Bressler on 1/17/17 and with Dr. Hirose on 1/29/18."
Aspen had the First Nielsen Report prior to the motion in limine deadline but brought no motion
to exclude based on a lack of foundation. Indeed, nothing stopped Aspen from deposing, or even
simply interviewing, Drs. Bressler and Hirose given their disclosure as non-party, non-retained
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expert witnesses, to inquire of them further regarding their concurrence with Ms. Nielsen's life
care plan, but Aspen did not do so. R. 472-473.
Aspen explored the medical foundation for Ms. Nielsen's life care opinions provided to
her by both Dr. Bressler and Dr. Hirose during her deposition. Ms. Nielsen specifically testified
that she spoke with both Dr. Bressler and Dr. Hirose and obtained their concurrence to the life
care plan. R. 1907. Ms. Nielsen further testified when questioned by Aspen's counsel about her
manner of obtaining confirmation from physicians that:
A:

My standard methodology is to prepare a life care plan that I can discuss
with the physician, and then that life care plan was dated January 12 of
[2017]. I then talked to Dr. Bressler on January 17th of 2017 and prepared
my next life care plan that included his recommendations on January 27 1\
2017. I faxed . . . that life care plan, the 1/27/17 life care plan, to Dr.
Hirose and spoke with him on 1/29/18, and I have not created a new life
care plan since then.

R. 1907.
Ms. Nielsen further testified at her deposition that her conversation with Dr. Bressler was
part of the evidence she considered in writing her life care plan and that she relied on
conversations with Mrs. Brauner's physicians, the review of the medical records, and her
experience in having reviewed bills and medical records for other amputees in determining the
future medical costs related to the high potential for falls by Mrs. Brauner. R. 1913; R. 1938.
Ms. Nielsen was also directly asked about her conversation with Dr. Hirose and testified
she could not recall any substance of the conversation other than his agreement with her life care
plan. R. 1939. Ms. Nielsen was specifically asked about the extra visits to her physician, Dr.
Bressler, set forth in the life care plan and testified that those came directly from her
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conversation with Dr. Bressler. R. 1949. Lastly, Ms. Nielsen testified that the mental health
counseling set forth in the life care plan also came directly from Dr. Bressler. R. 1950.
At trial and subject to cross-examination, Ms. Nielsen testified that she relied upon
medical necessity opinions of Dr. Hirose and Dr. Bressler in forming her life care plan, not that
she personally held or formed any opinions regarding the medical necessity of Mrs. Brauner's
future medical care. The trial court heard Ms. Nielsen's testimony regarding the foundation for
her reports, specifically that she had discussed the items in the life care plan with the providers
and confirmed that they were associated with the amputation. Tr., 814:11 -815 :23 . Aspen's
counsel then objected as to a lack of foundation and the trial court properly overruled that
objection. See id. Ms. Nielsen then testified that she confirmed with the physicians that the
amputation was a substantial factor in causing the care set forth in the life care plan, that the
amputation was a substantial factor in causing the past medical expenses, and that the past
expenses were reasonably and necessarily incurred. See id.; see also 817 :6-819:2 (further
foundation laid, and Aspen's objection overruled, regarding independent living facility medical
expenses). The trial court subsequently admitted the Second Nielsen Report as Plaintiffs
illustrative Exhibit 50, over Aspen's foundational objection. Tr., 827:13-19.
Ms. Nielsen also provided extensive testimony describing the methodology she utilizes in
generating a life care plan, as well as the ways she arrived at specific entries in Mrs. Brauner's
life care plan. Tr., 810:15-837:23. Ms. Nielsen testified that she excluded some items from her
life-care plan "in order to make sure it's a conservative estimate of [Mrs. Brauner's] future care."
Tr., 833:5-8; 836:21-837:15. Ms. Nielsen testified that the physician communications she had
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with Dr. Bressler and Dr. Hirose and the information obtained thereby is "reasonably relied upon
by experts in [her] field" and that all the resources she used in creating Mrs. Brauner's life care
plan are "reasonably relied upon by life-care planning experts." Tr., 825:12-826:9. There was
thus extensive trial testimony confirming that Ms. Nielsen did not hold medical opinions, only
that she relied upon the medical opinions of Mrs. Brauner' s treating providers in generating her
opinions and that such reliance is customary within the field of life-care planning.
At no point in time did Aspen offer any evidence that Ms. Nielsen's methodology and
reliance on medical opinions is not usual and customary within the field of life-care planning.4
Aspen's life care planning expert, Dr. Collins, did not testify that the facts, data, and
methodology utilized by Ms. Nielsen are not usual and customary within the field of life-care
planning. Tr., 1495: 17-1527:8. In fact, Dr. Collins' description of her methodology and the facts
and data she relies on in formulating life care plans is similar to Ms. Nielsen's description of her
methodology. Id., Compare Tr., 810:15-837:23. Thus, Dr. Collins' testimony bolsters the
conclusion that Ms. Nielsen's facts, data and methodology utilized to generate Mrs. Brauner's
life care plan are usual and customary within the field of life care planning.
This Court recently endorsed the utilization of a life care planner as an expert witness
regarding future medical needs in a medical malpractice case. In Herrett v. St. Luke 's Reg 'l Med.

Aspen cursorily stated in its February 19, 2018 memorandum and motion to exclude Ms.
Nielsen that "her opinions are not based upon information reasonably relied upon in her field as a
certified life care planner" (R. 883) and that her "testimony is based upon facts or data that is not
the type reasonably relied upon as an expert in her field." (R. 894-895). These statements,
however, are argument by counsel and are unsupported by any affidavit, deposition or trial
testimony by a witness competent to testify regarding the facts, data, and information reasonably
and customarily relied upon by life care planners such as Ms. Nielsen.
4
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Ctr., Ltd., the plaintiff called Ms. DeMint-Lee, a life care planner, to testify at trial "about the
cost of Herrett's future in-home medical care." 426 P.3d 480, 487 (2018). The trial court
overruled St. Luke's' objection that Ms. DeMint-Lee's opinions lacked the requisite foundation.
Id. Ms. DeMint-Lee did not even speak with the plaintiffs treating providers as Ms. Nielsen did

in this case. Id. Ms. DeMint-Lee only "reviewed Herrett's medical records and consulted with
other healthcare providers who had reviewed the records." Id. Citing Rule 703, however, this
Court ruled that St. Luke's "did not demonstrate that experts in the life-care planning field do not
rely on this type of information in forming their opinions. As such, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing Ms. DeMint-Lee to testify about Ms. Herrett's future care." Id.
Identically to St. Luke's in Herrett, Aspen has made no showing, and indeed never attempted to
show, that experts in the life-care planning field such as Ms. Nielsen do not customarily rely on
the opinions of medical providers regarding the necessity of future medical care in forming their
life care plans which place a quantitative value on such care. This ruling alone demonstrates that
the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in permitting Ms. Nielsen to testify.
This Court elaborated further in Herrett, ruling arguendo that any error was harmless
because St. Luke's did not object to the foundation for Ms. DeMint-Lee's testimony "relating to
the cost of such care, only the foundation for the cause and necessity of such care." Id.
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that even if the foundation for Ms. DeMint-Lee's testimony
was somehow lacking, the plaintiff introduced "other testimony regarding the cause of Ms.
Herrett's disability and the necessity for future in home care" through Ms. Herrett's physician
and husband who testified "regarding his wife's deteriorating condition following the stroke." Id.
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Similarly, in this case Aspen did not object to a lack of foundation for Ms. Nielsen to opine
regarding the actual cost of Ms. Nielsen's future medical care, only to the foundation for the
medical necessity thereof. R. 882-887, 895-897.
Though the alternative "harmless error" analysis discussed in Herrett need not be reached
because Ms. Nielsen relied upon methodology customarily utilized in the field of life-care
planning and Aspen did not challenge that point whatsoever, any theoretical foundational
infirmities in Ms. Nielsen's testimony are nonetheless harmless for the same reasons set forth in
Herrett. In this case there was competent testimony regarding both (1) the causation of Mrs.
Brauner's injury; and (2) the impact of Mrs. Brauner's injury on her physical and mental wellbeing and the deterioration of her condition subsequent to her injury.
As set forth above supra, Dr. Tullis opined regarding the cause of Mr. Brauner's
disability. Tr., 588:23-589:11. Regarding Mrs. Brauner's deteriorating condition and future care
needs, Mrs. Brauner testified extensively regarding the activities she could do before her injury
that she could not do after. Tr., 351 :5-356:4. Mrs. Brauner testified regarding her attempts to live
independently after the amputation, but being forced to move into an assisted living facility
because of her fall risk and the care and help provided. Tr., 361 :25-363:12. Mrs. Brauner
testified about her deteriorated physical condition and daily life after the amputation. Tr., 364:23366:24. Mrs. Brauner testified regarding her lack of mobility and what she uses to assist herself.
Tr., 369:9-370:1.
Mrs. Brauner's daughter-in-law, Valerie, testified regarding Mrs. Brauner's lack of
mobility after the amputation (Tr., 896: 14-898:25), Mrs. Brauner's increased pain after the
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amputation (Tr., 899: 1-7), and Mrs. Brauner's reduced independence and need for assisted living
after the amputation (Tr., 899:8-.900: 14).
Roberta Tavares, Mrs. Brauner's friend since 1965, testified regarding the deterioration in
Mrs. Brauner's physical condition after the amputation (Tr., 397:23-399: 14), Mrs. Brauner's lack
of mobility after the amputation (Tr., 399:15-400:23), and Mrs. Brauner's increased pain, lack of
independence, and sadness after the amputation (Tr., 401 :8-24).
Thus, even if for some reason Ms. Nielsen lacked foundation for the medical necessity
opinions relied upon in her life care plan, there was extensive trial testimony regarding the cause
of Mrs. Brauner's injury and Mrs. Brauner's deteriorating condition after the injury. In
accordance with Herrett, such testimony provides an additional, alternative basis of support for
Ms. Nielsen's opinions regarding the necessity and cost of Mrs. Brauner's future medical care.
Indeed, courts in numerous jurisdictions have ruled that life care planners such as Ms.
Nielsen customarily rely upon medical necessity opinions of medical providers to prepare life
care plans, bolstering this Court's main ruling in Herrett. The United States District Court for the
District of Kansas explained thusly regarding Lampton, the plaintiffs life care planning expert:
Defendant does not challenge Lampton's qualifications to provide expert opinion
about a life care plan. Defendant only objects to Lampton's qualifications to
testify about the medical necessity of certain treatment. As explained above,
Lampton may rely on the information provided by plaintiffs medical providers
about the medical necessity of certain treatment. The Court further notes that it
has reviewed Lampton's expert report which includes her curriculum vitae. Based
on her education, training, and experience, the Court finds that Lampton is
qualified to provide expert opinion testimony about plaintiffs life care plan.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bell, 30 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1108 (D. Kan. July 8, 2014). See also
Eggers v. Odell, 2018 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 3751 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 12, 2018) ("It is common
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practice for plaintiffs in ce1iain injury and medical malpractice cases to offer a 'Life Care Plan'
expert at trial . . . In my experience, they generally take the medical opinions of treatment
providers and non-treating experts and project the likely cost of future treatment and care over
the life expectancy of the plaintiff. This is not novel science. Life Care plans usually involve
experience-based projections.").
In sum, Aspen failed to move to exclude Ms. Nielsen on foundational grounds in
accordance with the trial Court's motion in limine deadline. Aspen failed to depose or speak with
Drs. Bressler and Hirose despite being aware that Ms. Nielsen was basing her life care plan on
those physicians' opinions regarding the medical necessity thereof. Aspen was able to examine
Ms. Nielsen at her deposition and trial regarding her reliance on the opinions of Drs. Bressler and
Hirose and it called Dr. Collins to testify to rebut Ms. Nielsen's opinions. Aspen waited until the
middle of trial, the day before Ms. Nielsen took the stand to testify, to challenge for the first time
the medical necessity foundations of her report and testimony. Upon hearing Ms. Nielsen's trial
testimony regarding her methodology and the medical necessity opinions of Drs. Hirose and
Bressler upon which she relied, as well as the unchallenged testimony regarding the customary
acceptance of such methodology in the field of life-care planning, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling Aspen's foundational objections to Ms. Nielsen 's report and testimony.

2.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Declining to Strike the
Second Nielsen Report.

Aspen argues that the trial court abused its discretion "when it denied Aspen's Motions to
Strike" the Second Nielsen Report because the trial court failed to consider Rules 16 and 26 of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant's Brief, 36-41.
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It is undisputed that the First Nielsen Report, setting forth claimed damages totaling
$1,366,749.00 ($547,850.00 in past medical expenses and $818,899.00 in future medical
expenses) was timely disclosed on November 6, 2017. R. 159-165 . The Second Nielsen Report,
disclosed on February 12, 2018 after Mrs. Brauner's expert disclosure deadline, claimed
damages totaling $1,132,602.00: $298,125.52 in past medical expenses and future medical
expenses presently valued at $834,477.00 by Dr. Walter Lierman. R. 2016-2022. Aspen ignores
the fact that the Second Nielsen report reduced Mrs. Brauner's total claimed damages by
$234,147.00.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 16(a)(3) governs modifications of scheduling orders: "the dates set by
the court ... must not be modified except by leave of the court on a showing of good cause. The
dates and deadlines in the scheduling order . . . must not be modified except by leave of the
court on a showing of good cause or by stipulation of all the parties and approval of the court."
Idaho R. Civ. P. Rule 26(e)(2) governs the supplementation of expert disclosures: "A
party must supplement in a timely manner the identity of each person expected to be called as an
expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the
substance of the person's testimony." Rule 26(e)(3) affords discretion to a trial court to impose
sanctions for failures to timely supplement: "The court may exclude the testimony of any witness
or the admission of evidence not disclosed by a supplementation required by this rule." Idaho R.
Civ. P. 37(c)(1) grants a court discretion to impose sanctions for violations of a Rule 16
scheduling order where the violation is neither "substantially justified nor harmless."
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Aspen recites these rules and argues that the Second Nielsen Report's disclosure after the
deadline was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The Second Nielsen Report, however,
was harmless because it reduced Mrs. Brauner's claimed damages. It is unclear why Aspen
would have wanted the Second Nielsen Report stricken, because that would have left it dealing
with the timely-disclosed First Nielsen Report which claimed damages $234,147.00 greater than
the Second Nielsen Report. Thus, striking the Second Nielsen Report would have been harmful
to Aspen, meaning the trial court's declination to do so was the definition of a harmless error.
Furthermore, the Second Nielsen Report's disclosure on February 11, 2018 was
substantially justified. Aspen fails to discuss the principle that an expert witness is not required
by the strictures of Rule 16 and Rule 26 to give false testimony on the stand in the event the
expert becomes privy to new information. It is axiomatic that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
require a party to update and supplement its expert disclosures or risk exclusion of the expert at
trial. "Idaho law specifically contemplates that expert testimony can change after the initial
disclosure." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 874, 136 P.3d 338, 345 (2006). This Court has
held that Rule 26 "unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement responses to
discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert's testimony where the
initial responses have been rejected, modified, expanded upon or otherwise altered in some
manner." Clarkv. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 157, 45 P.3d 810,813 (2002) (quotations omitted).
This obligation to update an initial expert disclosure does not expire or run out
temporally; a party's duty to supplement expert disclosures is "continuing." Thus, an expert
disclosure deadline set forth in Rule 16 does not, indeed cannot, preclude a party from fulfilling
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its continuing duty to supplement its initially disclosed experts and their reports. "In fact,
litigants are subject to sanctions, including the exclusion of expert testimony, when they have
failed to supplement an expert's opinion." Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 874, 136 P.3d at 345.
This Court noted that a great deal of discretion is left to the trial court to determine
whether a supplemented Rule 26 disclosure is timely disclosed:
The drafters of Rule 26 noted that "seasonably" was very imprecise and left
considerable discretion to the trial judge. Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 Idaho
205,213, 846 P.2d 207,215 (1993) (Bakes, C.J., concurring). This Court has not
yet announced a more precise definition of "seasonably." However, as Justice
Bakes noted in Hopkins: "an important inquiry in determining whether a response
was given 'seasonably' is: was the opposing party given an opportunity for full
cross examination? If 'yes,' then there probably would be no abuse of discretion
in admitting the testimony."
Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 875, 136 P.3d at 346.
It is undisputed that the Second Nielsen Report was disclosed on the eve of trial, after

Ms. Nielsen was deposed. The trial court, however, did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
Second Nielsen Report because it thoroughly explored the minimal changes from the First
Nielsen Report to the Second Nielsen Report. The primary change, which favored Aspen, was to
reduce the past medical expenses in accordance with the trial court's pretrial Dyet v. McKinley
ruling in limine regarding the presentation of paid, as opposed to billed, medical expenses to the
jury. Tr., 789:20-790:6. The trial court also considered a $30,000.00 reduction, again in Aspen's
favor, in the cost of Mrs. Brauner's modified van. Tr., 790:7-14. Significantly, Aspen's counsel
recognized that "the new report just reduces some of the numbers, not very much. But it does
reduce some of the numbers. I understand that." Tr., 791: 18-21.
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Also, Mrs. Brauner' s counsel represented that although Ms. Nielsen spoke with Mrs.
Brauner for the first time regarding the life care plan on the eve of trial, no changes were made to
thereto as a result: "[Ms. Nielsen] is only going to testify that she communicated with Mrs.
Brauner to confirm some of the elements of her life-care plan and that she made no significant
changes to the life-care plan as a result." Tr., 798: 17-24. The trial court then reasonably
exercised its discretion and allowed the Second Nielsen report: "I'll accept the representation
that there's not going to be any change in the nature of the reports from the discussions with the
plaintiff." Tr. , 801:9-12. Aspen cross-examined Mrs. Brauner as to the cost and usage of her
modified van. Tr., 848:16-18. Aspen also cross-examined Ms. Nielsen with regards to the timing
of her conversation with Mrs. Brauner. Tr., 841:19-842:15.
In sum, the only changes to the Second Nielsen Report were (1) a reduction based on the
trial court's decision in lirnine; and (2) minor changes such as adjusting the cost of a motorized
van that served to reduce Mrs. Brauner's claimed damages. Mrs. Brauner's counsel confirmed
that the Second Nielsen Report did not reflect changes based on Ms. Nielsen's meeting with Mrs.
Brauner, and Aspen cross-examined Ms. Nielsen with regards to the meeting with Mrs. Brauner
and the modified van. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deeming the disclosure
of the Second Nielsen Report a seasonable and substantially justified supplementation of Mrs.
Brauner's expert disclosures, and, most importantly, it was clearly not prejudicial to Aspen in
any form or fashion because it reduced Mrs. Brauner's claimed damages by $234,147.00.
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The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in any Manner
Regarding Ms. Nielsen's File and/or "Notes."
In the last of its arguments relating to Ms. Nielsen, Aspen tries to rectify its own
misfeasance regarding Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes." Aspen, however, took Ms. Nielsen's
deposition shortly before trial at its own peril and with warning from the trial court, and Aspen
failed to move to compel or proactively assert its rights with regards to a known discovery issue.
The trial Court did not abuse its discretion with regards to Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes."
Despite being disclosed as an expert witness on November 6, 2017, over three months
before trial, Ms. Nielsen was deposed on February 2, 2018, a mere eleven days prior to trial. 5 R.
1800-1803. The trial court warned the parties regarding the taking of expert depositions on the
eve of trial. On December 26, 2017, after several stipulated extensions to the discovery deadline,
Aspen asked the Court for more time to complete expert depositions, until January 28, 2018,
only two weeks before trial. R. 323-324. Significantly, the Court's permission to take expert
depositions well after the discovery deadline came with an explicit warning regarding new
information or surprises gleaned from expert depositions taken on the eve of trial:
And I just have to be clear about this, that you do that at your own peril because
we are not moving the trial date ... [I]f it gets to the point where you're learning
new things in the January depositions you're stuck with it. So I just want to try to
be as fair as I can on that by giving you advance notice.
R. 1470-1472 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs counsel deposed one of Aspen's experts, Dr. Brooke, even closer to trial, on
February 9, 2018. Plaintiffs counsel did so, however, fully mindful of the Court's
admonishment such deposition was being taken at Mrs. Brauner's peril, that she was "stuck
with" any new information or surprises arising therefrom.

5
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Aspen's counsel elected to take Ms. Nielsen's deposition via videoconference as Ms.
Nielsen resides in Portland, Oregon. Id. The deposition notice asked Ms. Nielsen to bring a copy
of her file to the deposition, which she did, but obviously counsel for Aspen and Mrs. Brauner
were in Boise, while Ms. Nielsen and her file were at the videoconferencing location in Oregon.
During the deposition Aspen's counsel extensively explored the First Nielsen Report with
Ms. Nielsen. Aspen's counsel explored, inter alia, whether Ms. Nielsen had consulted with two
of Mrs. Brauner's treating providers, Dr. Bressler and Dr. Hirose, regarding the First Nielsen
Report. Ms. Nielsen stated that she prepared a first draft written report, spoke with Dr. Bressler,
made revisions to the first draft based on that conversation, and the resulting draft incorporating
Dr. Bressler's recommendations became the First Nielsen Report dated January 27, 2017, and
disclosed on November 6, 2017. R. 1446, p. 24, 1. 3-8.
Ms. Nielsen later faxed the disclosed First Nielsen Report to Dr. Hirose and spoke with
Dr. Hirose on January 29, 2018, but she made no revisions to the First Nielsen Report based on
her conversation with Dr. Hirose. Ms. Nielsen testified that she faxed the life care plan to Dr.
Hirose and spoke with him on 1/29/18, but did not create a new life care plan. R. 1446, p. 24, 1.
10-17.
During her deposition, Ms. Nielsen stated that prior drafts of her disclosed written report
had some "notes" of the conversations she had with Dr. Bressler and Dr. Hirose. R. 1432.
Q:

Do you have notes of your conversation with Dr. Bressler regarding any
subject?

A:

I have them on the life care plan. So the January 12th life care plan, I just
have the notes directly on that as we were talking about the various
treatments.
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R. 1446, p. 24, I. 21-25.
Q:

Is there anything else that you remember with respect to your conversation
with Dr. Hirose?

A:

Nothing that isn't on my notes on this initial ... life care plan ...

R. 1447, p. 28, I. 12-16.
Aspen's counsel attempted to make Ms. Nielsen's entire file a deposition exhibit, but
Mrs. Brauner's counsel objected until such time as the file could be reviewed to assure that draft
reports or other privileged information protected by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure could be redacted or withheld. R. 1432-1433. Such review could obviously not take
place contemporaneously due to Aspen's decision to depose Ms. Nielsen via videoconference.
Mrs. Brauner's counsel made it clear that Aspen was nonetheless "free to inquire with
regards to [Ms. Nielsen's] discussions with Dr. Hirose and Dr. Bressler". R. 1432; 1447, p. 28, I.
8-9; p. 29, I. 23-24. Ms. Nielsen was permitted to read into the record the entirety of her notes of
her conversation with Mrs. Brauner's son, Robert, for example, as those notes were not part of
any privileged, non-discoverable draft report. R. 1436; R. 1444 p. 161. 23-R. 1445 p. 18, I. 10.
Ms. Nielsen mailed her file to Mrs. Brauner's counsel immediately after her deposition.

R. 1437. Mrs. Brauner's counsel confirmed that what Ms. Nielsen referred to as "notes" of her
conversations with Dr. Bressler and Dr. Hirose in her deposition were in fact minimal
handwritten revisions and editing marks that were part of two draft written reports dated January
12, 2017 and January 17, 2017. R. 1437; 1475. In accordance with her deposition testimony, and
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contrary to Aspen's consistent mischaracterization, Ms. Nielsen took no distinct notes of her
conversations with Dr. Bressler or Dr. Hirose. R. 1475.
The January 12, 2017 draft written report contained exactly four editing marks:
p. 1 - deletion of "was" in the "Background" paragraph.
p. 4 - addition of primary care physician and physical therapy appointments to
"Anticipated Future Medical Costs".
p. 4 - addition of power wheelchair to "Mobility Equipment".
p. 5 - addition of counseling services to "Anticipated Future Medical Costs".
R. 1437-1438. All four of these handwritten revisions on the January 12, 2017 draft report appear
in the First Nielsen Report, which was disclosed to Aspen on November 6, 2017, three months
prior to Ms. Nielsen's deposition. R. 159-165. Aspen thus had a full and fair opportunity at Ms.
Nielsen's deposition to explore her inclusion of these items in the First Nielsen Report.
The January 17, 2017 draft written report, which was disclosed on November 6, 2017 as
the First Nielsen Report, contains even more minimal editing marks, a mere three:
p. 4 - "keep her pain management team."
p.5 - "add prosthesis and modify if uses it."
p. 5 - "why not house maint."
R. 1438. None of these changes appear in the disclosed Second Nielsen Report. The first edit

mark indicates a lack of revision. As discussed in Ms. Nielsen's deposition, the second edit was
not made: "So, for example, one of his recommendations was add a prosthesis and cost of
modifications if in fact she uses it, but I since confirmed, I believe, that she's not using the
prosthesis, so it really has not changed that life care plan from 1/27/17." R. 1446, p. 24, I. 10-17.
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A cost for prosthetics undisputedly does not appear in the Second Nielsen Report. The third edit
mark regarding "house maint." again indicated a change that was not made which was explored
in Ms. Nielsen's deposition:
Q:

Why is it that you did not subtract out the cost of home maintenance,
housekeeping, yard work, and lawn care for the cost of room and board?

A:

I don't have those costs and so I don't know how relevant that is. It has
been entered in life care plans before for me that I subtract rent and food
and utilities, but I don't think I've ever subtracted just typical household
expenses.

Q:

Any why not?

A:

I think in my thinking process, and what we life care planners do, is if a
person is living at home and now has an amputation I would add the cost
of some home maintenance, for example, but I don't - I don't know- I
have to think about that. I don't know quite how relevant that would be if
there had been such expenses.

R. 1450, p. 71, I. 5-19. Aspen cross-examined Ms. Nielsen at trial regarding home maintenance
(Tr., 848:19-849:12), and Ms. Collins rebutted Ms. Nielsen on this issue (Tr., 1504:17-1507:20).
The figure for Mrs. Brauner's room and board at Touchmark Meadow Village as an amputee,
$43,920.00 annually, is identical in the First Nielsen Report and the Second Nielsen Report.

Compare R. 159-165 to R. 2016-2022. Thus, Ms. Nielsen testified accurately at her deposition
that her life care plan was unchanged by her January 29, 2018 conversation with Dr. Hirose. 6

The Second Nielsen Report removed a prescription for Gabapentin for Mrs. Brauner, but this
edit reduced Mrs. Brauner' s claimed damages, in favor of Aspen, and directly resulted from
exploration of this issue by Aspen's counsel during Ms. Nielsen's deposition: "Are you aware of
whether or not Leila Brauner had been taking Gabapentin before her amputation? ... Again, I try
to exclude medications preinjury versus post-injury .... So if that's new information, and I
always reserve the right to amend as new information becomes available, yes, I would change
that number." R. 1449, p.63 I. 17-p. 64, I. 13.
6
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Rule 26(b)(4)(B) explicitly excludes draft reports from discovery by an opposing party so that
experts are free to revise and edit prior to disclosure of final reports, which is exactly what Ms.
Nielsen did in this case.
Subsequent to Ms. Nielsen's deposition, in the extremely chaotic last week prior to the
commencement of a major medical malpractice jury trial, neither Ms. Nielsen' file, parts thereof,
nor a privilege log were produced to Aspen. R. 1438-1439. At no point in time during that week
did Aspen's counsel follow-up regarding Ms. Nielson's file or a privilege log, ask that it be
delivered, or otherwise inquire. R. 1439. Aspen did not send a meet and confer letter regarding
Ms. Nielsen's file or a privilege log, nor did it move to compel production thereof. Id.
As discussed supra, the trial court considered Aspen's motions related to Ms. Nielsen for
the first time in the middle of trial February 20, 2018, just prior to Ms. Nielsen taking the stand
to testify. In discussing the foundation for Ms. Nielsen's opinions, Aspen raised for the first time
the issue of whether Ms. Nielsen's file had been produced. Tr., 792:18-22. Confronted with
addressing this issue for the first time in the middle of trial rather than in response to a pretrial
request or a meet and confer letter, Mrs. Brauner's counsel initially mistakenly responded that
Ms. Nielsen's file had been produced to Aspen. Tr., 793:19 - 794:3. Mrs. Brauner's counsel
quickly corrected the record to reflect that Ms. Nielsen's file had not been produced because the
alleged "notes" of conversations between Ms. Nielsen, Dr. Bressler and Dr. Hirose were not
distinct notes but were in fact handwritten revisions to draft reports which are protected by Idaho
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). Tr., 794:8 - 795:5. The trial court then inquired as to whether "there [is]

anything different in those notes than what was disclosed at the deposition?" Tr., 795:6-9. To
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which Mrs. Brauner's counsel accurately responded that there was not.

Tr., 795:10-796:6;

Compare R. 1446, p. 24, 1. 10-17. The trial court then asked Mrs. Brauner' s counsel to submit
Ms. Nielsen's draft reports in a sealed envelope so it could review them if necessary. Tr., 796:711.

It should also be noted that the trial court recognized the significant distinction between

"draft" and "final" reports, as well as the privilege afforded draft reports: "I understand that
preliminary notes before a final report would not necessarily be disclosable." Tr., 801: 19-23. The
trial court then misunderstood Mrs. Brauner's counsel to be representing that "there was no final
report" in which case "the notes that we referred to amount to the final report." Id. But the First
Nielsen Report was disclosed after Ms. Nielsen spoke with Dr. Bressler on January 17, 2017 and
because the Second Nielsen Report reflected no changes resulting from Ms. Nielsen's
conversation with Dr. Hirose on January 29, 2018, Mrs. Brauner's counsel accurately responded:
"Every report we have given them has been a final report at that time ... [a]nd it incorporates
any prior discussions ... and they had a full opportunity to explore those discussions." Tr.,
802:2-12.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion with regards to its handling of Ms. Nielsen's
file and/or "notes" because Aspen undisputedly failed to seek relief from the trial court or bring a
motion to compel with regards thereto. 7 It is undisputed that Aspen never attempted to follow-up

Aspen filed a post-trial motion to compel production of Ms. Cook's file. R.1271-1295. The trial
court denied the motion. R. 2927-28; July 11, 2018 transcript, p. 138, I. 13-22. It is unclear
whether a post-trial discovery motion can even be brought under Idaho law. But in any event,
though Aspen briefly referenced its post-trial motion to compel production of Ms. Nielsen's file
in its factual recitation (Appellant 's Brief, 16), it has not presented any argument supported by
7
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with Mrs. Brauner's counsel regarding Ms. Nielsen's file or a privilege log after the conclusion
of Ms. Nielsen's deposition. Nor did Aspen bring a Rule 60(b)(3) motion with regards to Ms.
Nielsen's file and/or "notes." Thus, Aspen cannot appeal or seek any relief regarding the
inadvertent lack of production of Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" because it undisputedly failed
to seek such relief below. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 341, 347 (2008)
(this Court "will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.")
Aspen tries to "end-run" its failure to seek any relief based on Ms. Nielsen's file and/or
"notes" by attempting to tie this issue, in a scattershot manner, to the trial court's denial of
Aspen's February 19, 2018 motion to exclude Ms. Nielsen on foundational grounds. (Appellant's
Brief, 41-51.) Aspen cursorily alleges that the "Trial Court's failure to review documents which
were available and which contained discoverable notes of a communication with an expert, upon
whom Cook would rely, was an error" because the trial court instead "relied upon the
representations of counsel" regarding the content of Ms. Nielsen's file and the "notes." (Id., at
44-46.) Aspen then discusses case law from other jurisdictions considering the discoverability of
draft reports. (Id., at 46-49.) Aspen summarily concludes that the "Trial Court's decisions and
rulings on Cook must be reversed." (Id., at 51.)
It must be remembered there are only two pre-judgment "decisions and rulings" by the

trial court related to Ms. Nielsen: the trial court's denial of (1) Aspen's February 19, 2018

legal authority, and thus, waived any appeal of the trial court's denial of its post-trial motion to
compel production of Ms. Nielsen's file. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare,
147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 P.3d 988, 997 (2009) ("Under I.A.R. 35(a)(6), an issue raised on appeal
that is not supported in the brief by propositions of law or authority is deemed waived and will
not be considered by this Court.")

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 37

motion to strike the Second Nielsen Report; and (2) Aspen's February 19, 2018 motion to
partially exclude Ms. Nielsen's testimony on foundational grounds. Aspen never raised an issue
regarding Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" in any of its written submissions regarding its
February 19, 2018 Nielsen motions. R. 888-894; 882-887, 895-897. The only context before or
during trial in which Ms. Nielsen's file was discussed was during oral argument by Aspen's
counsel in support of Aspen's motion to exclude Ms. Nielsen's testimony on foundational
grounds. Tr., 803:8-804:10. Thus, the issue was only raised, at most, tangentially as support for
Aspen's argument regarding whether Ms. Nielsen had adequate foundation to testify at trial.
Aspen is critical of the trial court for relying upon the representations of Mrs. Brauner's
counsel regarding Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" (Appellant's Brief, 43-46), but that factual
circumstance was created by Aspen's misfeasance. Aspen raised this issue for the first time in
the middle of trial and the trial court had nothing to consider aside from the representations of
counsel regarding Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" because Aspen never moved the trial court to
"review documents which were available and which contained discoverable notes of a
communication with an expert" or otherwise put arguments and evidence in front of the trial
court with regards to Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes." The trial court did not abuse its discretion
with regards to a review that was never requested, production that was never compelled, or relief
that was never sought by Aspen.
So, cutting through Aspen's obfuscation on this point, the only thing that Aspen can
argue regarding Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" is that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Aspen's February 19, 2018 motion to partially exclude Ms. Nielsen from testifying on
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foundational grounds for the reason that Aspen, despite never filing a motion to compel or
following-up with Mrs. Brauner's counsel, never received a copy of her file and/or "notes" in
discovery: "The Trial Court did not conduct the appropriate analysis to determine if Cook's
disclosures complied with IRCP 26(b )." Appellant's Brief, 42.
Aspen falsely states that Ms. Nielsen's discussions with Drs. Bressler and Hirose "had
not been disclosed" and that there was "nothing in her disclosure setting forth the underlying
facts and data which supported her conclusion that the future expenses were medically necessary,
as a function of Plaintiffs amputation." Appellant's Brief, 42. To the contrary and as discussed at
length at pages 19-24, supra, the First Nielsen Report disclosed that Ms. Nielsen discussed the
report with Dr. Bressler (R. 160) and Aspen did not move in limine to exclude Ms. Nielsen based
on the First Nielsen Report. The Second Nielsen Report disclosed that Ms. Nielsen talked to Dr.
Hirose as well as Dr. Bressler (R. 2016), and Aspen deposed Ms. Nielsen regarding her
conversations with both Drs. Bressler and Hirose. Ms. Nielsen testified extensively in her
deposition and at trial that those physicians provided the medical necessity opinions upon which
she based her life care plan, as well as her experience, expertise, methodology, and the facts and
data customarily relied upon by life care planners in forming their opinions.
Aspen also complains that its ability to cross-examine Ms. Nielsen was impaired by the
inadvertent lack of production of her file and/or "notes" or a privilege log and that the trial court
erred by not personally reviewing Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" in denying Aspen's motion
to exclude Ms. Nielsen on foundational grounds. Appellant's Brief, 43, 50. The "notes" about
which Aspen repeatedly complains do not exist, however, because Ms. Nielsen took no distinct
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notes of her conversation with Dr. Bressler on January 17, 2017, nor of her conversation with Dr.
Hirose on January 29, 2018. R. 1475. In fact, Ms. Nielsen made a total of seven editing marks
which were part of privileged draft reports. R. 1437-1438; Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). These
seven total draft report editing marks, even if theoretically discoverable, in no way deprived
Aspen of a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Nielsen and present Dr. Collins'
rebuttal damages testimony. Furthermore, the Second Nielsen Report had no changes from the
First Nielsen Report, disclosed three months prior to Ms. Nielsen's deposition, based on Ms.
Nielsen's conversation with Dr. Hirose on January 29, 2018. R. 1446, p. 24, 1. 10-17.
The substance of Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" is of no moment, however, because
Aspen took Ms. Nielsen's deposition on the eve of trial at its own peril. Aspen never moved to
compel production thereof and waited to object to Ms. Nielsen's opinions until the middle of
trial, the day before she took the stand, so any prejudice suffered by Aspen in this regard is (1)
solely of its own making and (2) analytically distinct from the trial court's discretionary
decisions regarding the adequacy of the foundation supporting Ms. Nielsen's testimony. Aspen
cannot now on appeal complain of the allegedly adverse effects of a production it never sought to
compel. Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 429, 196 P.3d at 347.
Furthermore, it cannot be disputed that Aspen had the opportunity to fully cross-examine
Ms. Nielsen. Aspen extensively cross-examined Ms. Nielsen regarding: Ms. Nielsen's hours
spent on the case and billable rate (Tr., 838:7-840:22); the number of times Ms. Nielsen had
previously been retained by Mrs. Brauner' s counsel (Tr., 841: 1-8); whether Ms. Nielsen had
prepared a life care plan with factual circumstances similar to Mrs. Brauner's case (Tr., 841:13-
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18); the fact that Ms. Nielsen had not yet spoken to Mrs. Brauner when she was deposed, or
when she authored any report (Tr., 841: 19-842: 15); whether Ms. Nielsen was aware of evidence
of Mrs. Brauner suffering falls (Tr., 842: 16-22); Ms. Nielsen's presentations to plaintiffs
attorney organizations and rates of retention by plaintiffs attorneys (Tr., 842:23-844:16);
whether Ms. Nielsen includes items in a life care plan a patient has stated they do not want to
receive and whether Mrs. Brauner wanted to receive physical therapy and at what frequency (Tr.,
844: 17-848:6.); the likelihood of Mrs. Brauner requiring assisted living regardless of amputation
(Tr., 848:7-15); how often Mrs. Brauner uses her van (Tr., 848:16-18); the necessity of Mrs.
Brauner needing house maintenance costs in an assisted living facility (Tr., 848:19-849:12); Ms.
Nielsen's use of life expectancy tables (Tr., 849: 13-22); which of Mrs. Brauner's past medical
expenses were caused by the amputation (Tr., 849:22-851:4); Mrs. Brauner's access to the
assisted living facility's wheelchair (Tr., 851 :5-14);whether Ms. Nielsen read Mrs. Brauner' s
deposition (Tr., 851: 15-22); whether Ms. Nielsen excluded medications unrelated to Mrs.
Brauner's amputation (Tr., 851 :23-852:4); whether mental health treatment should be included in
a life care plan if not desired by the patient (Tr., 852:5-8); whether Ms. Nielsen allowed for Mrs.
Brauner's neuropathy in preparing the life care plan (Tr., 852:9-23); whether Mrs. Brauner
suffered from constipation before the amputation (Tr., 852:24-853:2); whether Mrs. Brauner
suffered from depression before the amputation (Tr., 853 :3-6.); and whether Mrs. Brauner
received mental health treatment from 2015-2017 (Tr., 853:7-9).
Nor can Aspen argue that it was unable to rebut Ms. Nielsen's testimony via Dr. Collins
who testified regarding: the use of life tables and work-life expectancy calculations by a life care
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planner to determine the age when certain activities become difficult or impossible (Tr.,
1498:14-1501:5); whether Dr. Collins agreed with Ms. Nielsen's physical therapy cost opinions
(Tr., 1501:10-1503:9); whether Dr. Collins agreed with Ms. Nielsen's mental health counseling
cost opinions. (Tr., 1503:10-20); whether Dr. Collins agrees with Ms. Nielsen's van cost
opinions. (Tr., 1503:21-1504:16); whether Dr. Collins agreed with Ms. Nielsen's assisted living
facility cost opinions, including house maintenance cost issues (Tr., 1504:17-1507:20); whether
Dr. Collins believed that Ms. Nielsen appropriately accounted for Mrs. Brauner's pre-existing
conditions (Tr., 1507 :21-1511: 13 ); and what sources, studies, or tables Dr. Collins would use to
calculate Mrs. Brauner's life expectancy (Tr., 1511:14-1513:23).
Rule 37 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure creates a meet and confer process by which
a party must remedy known discovery issues, a process Aspen chose not to avail itself of despite
the existence of a known discovery issue. A party cannot create reversible error by virtue of its
own declination to avail itself of available remedies. Parties would be incentivized to never file
motions to compel and parties would enjoy a "free run" at trial knowing an unremedied pre-trial
discovery issue had already provided the party a reversible error "re-do."
Courts have ruled, commonly in the context of Rule 60(b)(3) post-trial motions alleging
discovery misconduct, that where a party knows of a discovery issue pre-trial, the party is not
deprived of a "full and fair litigation opportunity" if the party does not avail itself of pre-trial
discovery remedies: "[t]he appropriate remedy for parties who uncover discovery violations is
not to seek reversal after an unfavorable verdict but a request for continuance at the time the
surprise occurs." Szeliga v. General Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 566, 568 (1st Cir. 1984). Aspen was
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aware at the time Ms. Nielsen's deposition, and before Ms. Nielsen testified at trial, of the
existence of her file and/or "notes", but it neither moved to compel nor sought a continuance
based on the inadvertent lack of production of Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes". See also Casey
v. Albertson's Inc, 362 F.3d 1254, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying Rule 60 motion because

"this is a run-of-the-mill discovery problem for which the rules provide remedies, had they been
sought ... Albertson's discovery recalcitrance does not constitute fraud. Moreover, Casey failed
to file a motion to compel production of Smith's employment records."); Babinec v. Yabuki, 799
P.2d 1325, 1334 (Alaska 1990) ("The trial court's determination that Dr. Okamoto's information
and documents were not pursued because of a tactical decision, is, in essence, a determination
that the defense was not deprived of a full and fair litigation opportunity .... Counsel appears to
have made a considered decision to rely on the Yabuki' s discovery misconduct before the jury
rather than to take steps to obtain the information that he knew he did not have.")
Though Aspen has not appealed the denial of its post-trial motion to compel production
of Ms. Nielsen's file, in denying that motion the trial court perfectly summarized this issue:
Well, this is one objection to the motion, and I'll iust say too late. This is a
matter that needed to be hammered in on, if it was of significance, prior to
the testimony of the witness. There was a flub in this, clearly, once the statement
was made and it wasn't followed through on. But the burden in this late process
that was occurring was to get it clearly before the Court before the witness
testified and was excused. So I deny the motion.
July 11, 2018 transcript, p. 138, I. 13-22 (emphasis added).
Subsequently, in its written order denying Aspen's post-trial motion to compel, the trial
com1 again perfectly summarized the entirety of the Nielsen issues by noting (1) Aspen took Ms.
Nielsen's deposition on the eve of trial at its own peril having been warned by the trial court; (2)
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the "non-existent" chance that Aspen was deprived a fair trial based on the Nielsen file issues;
(3) Aspen's receipt of a full and fair opportunity to explore the issue of damages; and (4) the
significance of the fact that Aspen was aware that Ms. Nielsen's file had not been produced but
chose not to act with regards thereto:
The deposition [of Ms. Nielsen] that was taken when this issue of production was
allowed by the then assigned judge beyond the discovery deadline. That is not an
excuse for giving incorrect information by counsel for the plaintiff, which did in
fact occur. The portions of the file sought had not been produced. Nonetheless,
the issue was on the table and could have been pursued by the defendant. The
defendant knew that nothing more had been produced. The witness had been
deposed, subject to examination as to what she considered, affording the
defendant an opportunity to cross-examine and test her conclusions, as well as
offer any contrary evidence. The tools for adequately cross-examining were
present. The likelihood that note or a draft or a revision that the defendant did not
see deprived the defendant of a fair trial is at best low, and, in this court's opinion
non-existent. There is a flaw in the process, but it is a flaw that could have been
addressed. The plaintiffs age, life expectancy, injuries, economic status, future
needs for care, and any other relevant factors were clear [sic] subject to
contradictory evaluations as to damages.
R. 2927-28 (emphasis added). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in any manner in its
handling of the issues attendant to Ms. Nielsen's file and/or "notes" and there was no error in
allowing Ms. Nielsen to testify in this matter. Therefore, Aspen's appeal must be denied.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Admitted Dr. Moore's Testimony at Trial.

Aspen's first argument on appeal related to Dr. Moore is that the trial court erred in
allowing Dr. Moore to testify at trial as an expert witness in Mrs. Brauner's case-in-chief. The
basis for this argument is that, first, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Moore to
testify because Mrs. Brauner's expert witness disclosure for Dr. Moore was untimely and failed
to comply with the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). Secondly,
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Aspen asserts that Dr. Moore should have been disclosed as a retained expert witness under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(i) and the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
Dr. Moore to testify despite Mrs. Brauner' s failure to disclose Dr. Moore in accordance with that
rule.
As is set forth below, these arguments are entirely without merit.

Aspen failed to

preserve any issue related to Dr. Moore's testimony for appellate review by failing to bring a
motion to exclude or limit his testimony before the trial court and by failing to make a specific
objection to Dr. Moore's testimony that would have apprised the trial court of the specific basis
for that the objection. Additionally, Aspen failed to make any objection the third question posed
to Dr. Moore and, therefore, any error in overruling the prior objections was harmless. Lastly,
even if the issue was properly preserved for appeal, Mrs. Brauner' s Amended Disclosure of Dr.
Moore's expected opinions complied with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) and there was no basis for
excluding the Amended Disclosure because the filing of the Amended Disclosure one business
day after the original disclosure was both harmless and proper under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedures 37(c) and 26(e).
1.

Aspen Failed to Preserve any Issue Related to Dr. Moore's Testimony
for Appellate Review.

Under established Idaho law, "[f]or an objection to be preserved for appellate review,
'either the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection
must be apparent from the context."' Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469,473, 299 P.3d 781, 785
(2013) (quoting Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 915, 921, 104 P.3d 958, 963 (2004)). In Hansen,
the Court held that an objection that the expert's testimony "invaded the province of the jury"
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under Rule 702 was not specific enough to preserve the objection. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 474,
299 P.3d at 786. This Court held "there are a number of reasons an attorney may object to
evidence under I.R.E. 702 grounds and an objection that expert testimony invades the province
of the jury, without more, is not sufficiently specific to preserve an objection to any of them."
See id. Thus, the clear holding is that, without either specific argument or other context to clarify
the objection, a general citation to a rule of civil procedure is not sufficiently specific to preserve
the objection on appeal.
Within the Appellant's brief, Aspen asserts it "repeatedly attempted to have Dr. Moore's
testimony limited or excluded pursuant to IRCP 16 and 26." See Appellant's Brief, p. 53.
However, a review of Aspen's citations to the record demonstrates the fallacy of the claim. See
id.

Specifically, Aspen cites to the February 9, 2018 hearing on Aspen's motion to compel

disclosure of the settlement agreement between Dr. Moore and Mrs. Brauner and two objections
during Dr. Moore's direct testimony based on "Rules 16 and 26." 8 See id. Neither the February
9, 2018 hearing, nor the two objections at trial, were sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate
review and, therefore, Aspen has waived any appeal of those issues.

While these are the only citations to the record in Aspen's argument, Aspen makes a reference
in its "statement of facts" that, during argument after Dr. Moore's direct testimony, Mr.
McAllister "points out that Dr. Moore's disclosure was late ... " See Appellant's Brief, p. 14.
However, this argument occurred after the testimony which Aspen asserts on this appeal should
have been excluded and, further, consisted solely of the statement that "[n]ow he has - and I
think it was disclosed late, but now he has two or three opinions that says he was very concerned
-- ..... " Tr., 726: 12-15. This was clearly not a formal motion to strike the prior testimony.
8
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a.

The February 9, 2018 hearing did not address the expert witness
disclosures for Dr. Moore.

Aspen first asserts that the trial court ruled on the admissibility and permissible scope of
Dr. Moore's direct testimony at the hearing on February 9, 2018 on Aspen's motion to compel
production of the settlement agreement between Dr. Moore and Mrs. Brauner. Tr., 101:17-19.
However, this was not a hearing on a motion to exclude Dr. Moore as an expert witness or to
limit his testimony as an expert witness. See id.
The specific portion of the February 9, 2018 argument cited by Aspen in the Appellant's
Brief is page 119 of the Transcript. This portion of the argument consists solely of Aspen's
counsel stating that Dr. Moore was disclosed as a rebuttal expert and what that rebuttal
disclosure said. Tr., 119:12-25. Nothing in that portion of the transcript, or indeed in any
portion of the February 9, 2018 hearing contains a motion to exclude or limit Dr. Moore's
testimony based on a failure to comply with Rules 16 and 26, or even raises that issue to the trial
court. There is absolutely no reasonable interpretation of that tiny piece of argument on a motion
to compel the disclosure of the settlement agreement to even suggest a request to exclude or limit
Dr. Moore's testimony.
On page 57 of the Appellant's Brief, Aspen cites to the transcript of the February 9, 2018
hearing where Mr. Rossman stated to the trial court that Dr. Moore's opinions were disclosed in
the initial disclosures. Tr., 123:25 - 124:9. Aspen then states "McAllister attempted to explain
this was not true, and that the actual substance of Dr. Moore's testimony was only disclosed for
the first time in Plaintiffs' January Rebuttal Disclosure." See Appellant's Brief, p. 57. However,
Ms. Brown's (not Mr. McAllister's) comment about the rebuttal disclosures came before Mr.
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Rossman's comment. See Tr., 119-120; 123-124. Furthermore, nothing in that cited portion of
the transcript notifies the trial court that Aspen's trial counsel was objecting to this rebuttal
disclosure or any disclosure. See id. If Aspen's trial counsel believed that Mr. Rossman was
misrepresenting the facts to the trial court, it was incumbent upon them to ask the trial court to
allow them to correct the record. The utter failure to make any attempt to do that demonstrates
that Aspen understood that Mr. Rossman was correct and the opinions were disclosed in the
November 9, 2017 Amended Disclosure of Expert Witnesses. The record clearly demonstrates
that nothing that occurred in the February 9, 2018 hearing preserved the issue of the propriety of
Dr. Moore's expert witness disclosure and/or testimony for review by this Court.
b.

Aspen's counsel's objections to Dr. Moore's testimony did not
preserve the issue for appeal.

The only other citations to the record provided by Aspen to support the claim that this
issue was raised before the trial court are citations to the trial transcript. First, Aspen cites to a
"continuing objection at trial." See Appellant 's Brief, p. 53. The citation is to the portion of
testimony when Mrs. Brauner's counsel began asking Dr. Moore about her condition on March
16th and 17th and specifically asked if malposition was a concern for him with patients in
orthopedic surgery. Tr., 721:6-12.

Mr. McAllister objected "to this question and line of

questioning based on Rule 16 and 26 regarding disclosures." See id. The trial court overruled
the objection. See id. Contrary to Aspen's assertion, there was no request for a continuing
objection, nor was a continuing or standing objection granted by the Court. See id. Furthermore,
the Court did not err in overruling the objection because Dr. Moore did, in fact, testify to this
concern in his deposition during his questioning by Mr. McAllister, R. 2201, LL 2-9, and was
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then asked further questions about this testimony by Mr. Rossman, without objection. 2231, LL
5-20.
Following this ruling on this first objection, this exchange occurred:
So, as you review this note at 3:03 a.m., is the information
Q.
concerning to you in that note?
A.

Yes.

Had Aspen contacted you at that time and told you this
Q.
information, what would you have done?
MR. McALLISTER: I'll object. Same basis. Rule 16 and 26.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
Tr., 722:6-15. Aspen's counsel did not request a sidebar or argument before the Court to identify
the specific portions of Rules 16 and 26 which Aspen believed Dr. Moore's expert witness
disclosure violated. See id.
Just moments later, Mrs. Brauner's counsel asked Dr. Moore what he would have done
had he been contacted by the Aspen nurses in the early morning of March 17, 2014. Tr., 723724. Aspen's counsel offered no objection to this question. Tr., 723-724. Dr. Moore testified that
he would have referred Mrs. Brauner to the emergency department. Tr. , 723-724.
Aspen cites to no other place in the record where Aspen moved to exclude or limit Dr.
Moore's testimony. See Appellant's Brief, p. 53. Aspen's failure to raise the issue with the trial
court in any way prior to trial or even prior to Dr. Moore's testimony, renders the objections at
trial insufficient to preserve the issue of any error by the trial court in failing to exclude or limit
Dr. Moore's testimony. Neither "timeliness" nor Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) were referenced in the trial
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objections and there is no context of a prior argument or briefing that would have made the
objection clear to the trial court. Here, just as in Hansen, there are many different reasons an
attorney might make an objection under Rules 16 and 26 in relation to an expert and, without
more, a general citation to the rule is insufficient to preserve the objection. See Hansen, l 54
Idaho at 474, 299 P.3d at 786. As is fully set forth above, the record is entirely devoid of any
argument or briefing which could provide the necessary context to salvage the general
objection. 9
To allow Aspen to make no effort to place the questions of timeliness and sufficiency
properly before the trial court and yet ask this Court to now rule on those issues for the first time
would render the abuse of discretion standard meaningless. 10 As such, Aspen's appeal of the
trial court's determination that Dr. Moore could testify at trial as to what he would have done had
he been contacted by Aspen's nurses on March 16th or 17 th of 2014, must be denied as that issue
was not preserved for appellate review.

In contrast, Aspen's counsel did raise a motion before the trial court related to another of
Plaintiffs experts, Dr. Tullis, regarding whether certain opinions were disclosed in the expert
witness disclosure and/or the deposition. Tr., 575-582. After the trial court allowed the
testimony, Aspen's counsel specifically asked for a continuing objection which was granted by
the trial court. Tr., 582:25-583 :2. The fact that Aspen's counsel made no such motion and asked
for no such continuing objection during Dr. Moore's testimony demonstrates that it was a
deliberate choice by Aspen's counsel and that the issue was not preserved for appeal.
10
It should also be noted that, under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 37, complete
exclusion of the evidence is a possible sanction for such violations, not a mandatory sanction.
See IRCP 16(e)(2); 37(b) and (c). Thus, Aspen is asking this Court to substitute its judgment for
the trial court's not only on whether a substantive violation occurred, but also on what the
appropriate sanction should have been had the issue been properly brought to the trial court's
attention.
9
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c.

Aspen's failure to object to Dr. Moore's testimony regarding
March 17, 2014 is fatal to its appeal as to Dr. Moore.

As was noted above, although Aspen's counsel offered two objections during Dr.
Moore's direct examination at trial, it did not object to a third question wherein Dr. Moore
testified that had he been contacted by Aspen's nurses on the early morning hours of March 17,
2014, he would have immediately referred Mrs. Brauner to the emergency department. Tr., 723724. Aspen's failure to object, and the lack of any continuing objection requested by Aspen or
granted by the trial court, renders any error in the overruling of the prior objections harmless.
As was set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, Mrs. Brauner offered the testimony of
Dr. Tullis, a board-certified vascular surgeon at trial and Dr. Tullis testified that, based on his
experience, had Mrs. Brauner been transferred to the emergency department even as late as 3 :41
AM on March 17, 2014, her injury would have been diagnosed and treated. Tr., 582:19- 583:5.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 specifically provides that "no error in admitting or excluding
evidence . . . is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating,
modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceedings, the
court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights." In
this case, even if Aspen properly preserved the issue of Dr. Moore's testimony in regard to the
two questions to which it objected, the failure to object to the question regarding what he would
have done at 3:41 AM on March 17, 2014, renders any such error in denying those two
objections harmless. As such, Aspen's appeal of error by the trial court in allowing the earlier
testimony regarding what Dr. Moore would have done at 3 :03 AM on March 16, 2017 must be
denied because any alleged error was entirely harmless.
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2.

Mrs. Brauner Properly Disclosed Dr. Moore's Expected Testimony.

In support of its claim that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Moore to testify at trial,
Aspen asserts that Mrs. Brauner' s disclosure of Dr. Moore's opinions did not comply with Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 because it was not disclosed in accordance with the deadline set forth
in the trial court's scheduling order and amendments thereto. Aspen further asserts that the
disclosure did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26 because "this disclosure did not
provide a summary of Dr. Moore's opinions, or the facts on which they were based .... " See
Appellant's Brief, p. 52. Even assuming this issue was preserved for appellate review, and is not

harmless error, these assertions are baseless.
a.

There was no error in failing to exclude Dr. Moore based on the
November 9, 2017 Amended Expert Witness Disclosure.

The trial court's scheduling order originally set the deadline for disclosure of Mrs.
Brauner' s expert witnesses for August 11 , 2017. R. 71. Although Aspen now asserts that the
actual deadline, after stipulations of the parties was no later than November 1, 2017, as was
discussed earlier, this contention is directly disputed by the Affidavit of Leslie S. Brown,
Aspen's trial counsel, filed on February 19, 2018. R. 889, ,r 2.
Nonetheless, Mrs. Brauner concedes that the November 6, 2017 expert witness disclosure
for Dr. Moore did not contain the disclosure of his expected testimony regarding what he would
have done had he been contacted by Aspen nurses in March of 2017. R. 115-116. This was a
result of mere oversight, R. 1490,

,r

8, and was corrected on November 9, 2017 with the

Amended Disclosure of Expert Witnesses. R. 192; 207. Notably, November 6, 2017 was a
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Friday and November 9, 2017 was a Monday. Thus, the Amended Witness Disclosure was filed
and served exactly one business day after the original disclosure.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) provides that exclusion of evidence for failure to
comply with a scheduling order is only allowed if the failure is not substantially justified or not
harmless. Here, even a cursory review shows the alleged "failure" was harmless. The Amended
Expert Witness Disclosure was served one business day after the original disclosure and was, as
to Dr. Moore solely to correct an oversight. 11 Aspen has never even attempted to argue it was
prejudiced or harmed by the one business day delay. As such, Aspen's attempt to have the jury
verdict overturned and the judgment vacated based on the filing of the Amended Expert Witness
Disclosure for Dr. Moore one business day after the original disclosure must be soundly rejected.
b.

The Amended Disclosure for Dr. Moore met the requirements of
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).

The November 9, 2017 Amended Disclosure met the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).

This Rule requires that, for non-retained experts, the disclosure

contain a statement of the subject matter on which the witness is expected to provide evidence
and a summary of facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify. The November
9, 2017 Amended Disclosure provided the following:
Dr. Moore is a percipient witness who has not been retained to testify as
an expert witness for the Plaintiff in this case.
Dr. Moore will testify in a manner consistent with his dictated medical
notes and chart records relating to the care and treatment of Plaintiff.
11

It should also be noted that the Amended Disclosure of Expert Witnesses included amended

disclosures for Mrs. Brauner's nursing experts and Dr. Ludwig in addition to the Amended
disclosure for Dr. Moore. R. 192-208. Aspen never filed a motion to exclude any of these
witnesses due to an untimely disclosure.
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Dr. Moore will testify at trial that had he been contacted following the
nursing note entries on March 14, 2014 through March 17, 2014, more likely than
not, he would have immediately referred the Plaintiff to the emergency
department. Dr. Moore will further testify at trial that the community standard of
care in March of 2014 required immediate communication with the physician
followed by immediate referral to the emergency department.
R. 207.
No reasonable reading of this disclosure can possibly construe the disclosure as anything
but compliance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). The disclosure clearly states the subject matter on
which Dr. Moore is expected to testify - his care and treatment of Mrs. Brauner and what he
would have done if contacted by Aspen nurses with information placed in the notes between
March 14, 2014 and March 17, 2014. The disclosure clearly provides a summary of his opinions
- that he would have immediately referred Mrs. Brauner to the emergency department had he
been contacted with the information in the nursing notes and that the community standard of care
for orthopedic surgeons required communication with the physician and immediate referral to the
emergency department. 12 Lastly, the disclosure provides the factual basis for his opinions - his
dictated medical notes and chart records, as well as the nurses notes between March 14, 2017 and
March 17, 2014. That is all that is required by the rule. 13 To the extent Aspen wanted to explore

Aspen has asserted at below and on appeal, that the "standard of care" reference in the
Amended Disclosure was the standard of care for nurses. This is incorrect. It was clearly a
reference to the standard of care for orthopedic surgeons. This fact is easily demonstrated by the
amended disclosure for Dr. Ludwig. Dr. Ludwig's amended disclosure stated he would testify
that the "standard of care" required communication with the treating orthopedic physician and/or
immediate referral to the emergency department. Clearly Mrs. Brauner was not stating that she
expected Dr. Ludwig, Aspen's own medical director, to testify that Aspen's nurses breached the
standard of care.
13
Aspen also asserts the disclosure did not identify the basis for Dr. Moore's knowledge of the
local standard of care. Assuming the patient's local treating orthopedic surgeon is required to
12
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what was, or was not , significant within those notes, they had a full and fair opportunity to do
that within his deposition. See generally, R. 2092-2238 (Dr. Moore's deposition).
Aspen asserts that Mrs. Brauner's inadequate disclosure affected Aspen's substantial
rights because, until the January 9, 2017 rebuttal disclosure, Aspen thought Dr. Moore was just a
treating physician that was going to testify about his own treatment and records. See Appellant's

Brief, p. 67. Aspen also claims this resulted in a trial by ambush. Both claims are, quite frankly,
ridiculous. The only way that Aspen, or Aspen's trial counsel, could have possibly believed that
Dr. Moore was not going to testify on the important causation question of what he would have
done had he been contacted by Aspen's nurses is if they simply did not read the Amended
Disclosure. No reasonable attorney, or lay person for that matter, could read the Amended
Disclosure and conclude that Dr. Moore was only going to testify about his records and treatment
of Mrs. Brauner and not address the issue of what he would have done had he been contacted by
Aspen's nurses sometime between March 14 and March 17, 2014. Further, Aspen deposed Dr.
Moore on January 18, 2017, more than three weeks before trial, had a full and fair opportunity to
explore the specifics of his opinions, but chose not to do so. See R. 2237-2238 (Dr. Moore's
deposition). Therefore, to the extent Aspen and/or Aspen's trial counsel did not understand the
full content of Dr. Moore's expected testimony, or were "ambushed," that can only be blamed on
the failure to read the Amended Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and/or the deliberate choice not
to explore Dr. Moore's expected opinion during his deposition. Aspen's complete failure to
specifically disclose his familiarity with the local standard of care for orthopedic surgeons
beyond the fact that he is an orthopedic surgeon practicing in the community, this issue is
irrelevant. Dr. Moore never offered an opinion on the standard of care for orthopedic surgeons at
his deposition or at trial. He simply testified as to what he would have done.
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object to the disclosure or move to exclude or limit the testimony demonstrates that Aspen was
not, in fact, misled, confused, or ambushed by the alleged deficiencies of the disclosure.
Therefore, Aspen's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Moore to
testify must be denied and the judgement must be affirmed.
c.

Dr. Moore was not required to be disclosed as a retained expert
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(i)

Aspen next asserts that the trial court "erred in applying IRCP 26(b )( 4)(A)(ii)' s nonretained expert standard in the first place." See Appellant's Brief, p. 61. Again, Aspen has never
identified any place in the record where the trial court was asked to determine anything in regard
to the disclosure for Dr. Moore, let alone whether Dr. Moore should have been disclosed as a
retained expert witness.

That failure alone is sufficient basis to reject and ignore Aspen's

argument on this issue.
Nonetheless, Aspen's argument must fail on substantive grounds as well. Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) applies to "[i]ndividuals with knowledge of relevant facts not
acquired in preparation for trial and who have not been retained or specially employed to provide
expert testimony .... " See id. Aspen asserts that Dr. Moore acquired knowledge of relevant
facts in preparation for trial and, therefore, is not a non-retained expert.
The record reflects that during the litigation process, Mrs. Brauner's counsel asked Dr.
Moore's counsel a question regarding what Dr. Moore would have done if contacted by Aspen
nurses between March 14, 2014. and March 17, 2014. R. 1480,

~

4.; 1489,

~

5. Nothing in the

record supports Aspen's accusation that Mrs. Brauner provided documents or information to Dr.
Moore or that Dr. Moore worked with Mrs. Brauner's counsel to develop his opinion.
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Furthermore, Aspen wrongly implies that Dr. Moore's involvement as a treating physician of
Mrs. Brauner ended on March 14, 2014. Aspen's trial counsel admitted at trial that Mrs. Brauner
had an appointment to see Dr. Moore on March 17, 2014. Tr., 324:3-5. Dr. Moore testified to
this appointment at his deposition. R. 2192, LL 8-10. Thus, despite the position Aspen has taken
on this appeal, Aspen has previously stated that Dr. Moore was still Mrs. Brauner's treating
orthopedic physician on March 16 and 17, 2014 and the record reflects this to be true.
To support its argument, Aspen cites to federal case law for the proposition that a treating
physician may be disclosed as a non-retained witness only as to opinions formed "during the
course of treatment." See Appellant's Brief, p. 62. Mrs. Brauner acknowledges these federal
cases, but also affirmatively states that the federal rule differs significantly from Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) expressly applies
to "individuals whose knowledge of relevant facts was not acquired in preparation for trial and
who have not been retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony" and there is no
substantially similar language in federal rules. See F.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(C). Therefore, while the
federal court cases have focused on when the expert's opinion was formed, the Idaho Rule
specifically references the manner in which the individual's knowledge of relevant facts was
acquired.
Mrs. Brauner anticipates that Aspen will assert that this distinction does not matter for
purposes of Dr. Moore because he stated that he obtained and reviewed the nurses notes during
litigation in this matter. It is absolutely true that Dr. Moore stated this in his Declaration. R.
1517, ~ 3. However, his Declaration makes no representation that it was the first or only time he
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reviewed the Aspen nursing notes. At his deposition, Dr. Moore testified that he had discussions
with Mrs. Brauner in the emergency room and his initial approach was to try and figure out what
happened, how she got the fracture. R. 2198, LL 19-23. Dr. Moore then testified he tried to
determine the time frame of a fall Leila reported, but "in subsequent notes" he was unable to
confirm a specific incident. R. 2198, line 25 - p. 2199, line 3. He then "scoured the notes top to
bottom to look for any notation that would explain to me this chain of events .... " R. 2199, LL
3-6. Thus, while Dr. Moore did receive and review the nursing notes during the litigation of this
matter, he also reviewed them in the aftermath of Mrs. Brauner's transfer to the emergency room
on March 17, 2014 to try and determine what had happened. See id.
Based on this deposition testimony elicited by Aspen's counsel, and Dr. Moore's status
as Mrs. Brauner's treating physician until March 17, 2014, it is apparent that Dr. Moore did not
"acquire" his knowledge of relevant facts, including his knowledge of Aspen's nursing notes,
solely in preparation for trial and certainly not in preparation for providing expert testimony at
trial. Rather, even if Dr. Moore was referring to "scouring" the nursing notes obtained during the
litigation, Dr. Moore's deposition testimony makes clear that he was scouring the notes to try
and figure out the "chain of events." As was set forth above, the nursing notes at issue were
undisputedly generated while Dr. Moore was still Mrs. Brauner's treating orthopedic physician.
Furthermore, the precise question asked of Dr. Moore is what he would have done had he been
contacted. Tr., 722:10 - 724:15. This opinion, to the extent it constitutes an expert opinion
rather than a statement of fact by a treating physician, is necessarily based largely on knowledge
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of relevant facts he "acquired" as her treating orthopedic surgeon, either before the amputation or
in his search for answers afterwards.
Dr. Moore's status as a non-retained expert is further supported by Dr. Moore's existence
as a defendant in this case at the time he received and reviewed the records. Unlike the federal
cases cited by Aspen, Dr. Moore was not provided the nursing notes by Mrs. Brauner's counsel
in the course of seeking an opinion, he was provided the notes in the course of discovery and it is
unclear from the record whether the records he reviewed were produced by Mrs. Brauner or
Aspen as both parties produced those records in discovery.
Aspen also asserts that Dr. Moore should have been disclosed as a retained expert witness
because he expressed his opinions at the request of Plaintiffs counsel. However, nothing in
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) states that a treating physician becomes a retained
expert witness simply because he or she cooperates with plaintiffs counsel in some manner. As
was discussed in Easterling v. Kendall, l 59 Idaho 902, 912, 367 P .3d 1214 (2016), it is improper
for a party to disclose expected opinions of treating physicians which were not actually provided
by the physicians and/or where the physicians had not indicated they would offer such opinions
at trial.

See id.

Under Aspen's theory, simply asking the question of a treating physician

converts the treating physician into a retained expert if they choose to answer. Therefore, the
only treating physicians who can be disclosed as non-retained experts are those unwilling to
speak to plaintiffs counsel outside of a deposition. Nothing in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) contemplates
such a distinction.
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Aspen falsely asserts that Mrs. Brauner "directed" Dr. Moore to the same litigation
documents as Mrs. Brauner' s disclosed retained rebuttal expert reviewed and asked Dr. Moore to
opine on the same issues. Not surprisingly, there is no citation to the record to support this
claim. See Appellant's Brief, p. 65. As was set forth above, Mrs. Brauner never directed Dr.
Moore to any documents, rather a question was asked as to what Dr. Moore would have done if
contacted and given the information in the nursing notes. Mrs. Brauner's counsel did not send
the Aspen nursing records to Dr. Moore and ask him to provide opinions based on those notes.
He asked if Dr. Moore, through Dr. Moore's counsel, if he had seen the notes and what he would
have done. R. 1487-1489. Aspen can restate and rephrase those facts as many times as it wants,
but it will not tum Dr. Moore into a retained expert witness and it will not tum the request into
anything more than it was - a simple, factual question to a potential witness who also happened
to be a defendant in the action.
Under the circumstances of this case, had the issue been properly placed before the trial
court, it would have been well within the trial court's discretion to conclude that Dr. Moore did
not "acquire" his knowledge of relevant facts in preparation for trial of this matter. Furthermore,
given the lack of controlling Idaho precedent, the information set forth in the Amended
Disclosure for Dr. Moore, Aspen's failure to raise the issue until trial (assuming this Court finds
the general objection to have preserved the issue), and Aspen's opportunity to fully explore Dr.
Moore's opinions at his deposition, it would have been well within the trial court's discretion to
find that any failure to disclose Dr. Moore pursuant to Rule 26(b )( 4 )(A)(i) was substantially
justified or harmless. As such, Aspen's argument that Dr. Moore's testimony should have been
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excluded because it was not disclosed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(i)
must be denied and the judgment must be affirmed.
D.

The Trial Court Properly Excluded Evidence of the Fact of Settlement.

Aspen next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Aspen to
inform the jury that Dr. Moore had been a defendant in the lawsuit and had settled with Mrs.
Brauner. Aspen asserts that the trial court failed to consider the overall record regarding Dr.
Moore's bias and credibility and focused only on the terms of the written settlement agreement.
Aspen also asserts that the trial court erred because he focused on the admissibility of the
settlement agreement, not whether the jury should be informed of the fact of settlement. As will
be discussed in detail below, these arguments are incorrect factually and the record amply
demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the admission of the fact
of settlement or Dr. Moore's former status as a defendant in the action.
In support of its assertion that the fact of settlement is admissible, Aspen first cites to
Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000). In Perry, a

husband and wife had filed suit against the hospital. During litigation, the parties separated and
"[d]ivorce and child custody proceedings were not amicable." See id. at 49, 995 P.2d at 819.
During the divorce proceedings, the husband settled his loss of consortium claim with the
hospital.

See id.

The day after the settlement, the husband provided deposition testimony

extremely unfavorable to the wife, including that the family court-ordered child custody
evaluator's unfavorable opinion of the wife. See Perry, 134 Idaho at 49-50; 995 P.2d at 819-820.
At trial, the hospital sought to exclude evidence of the amount and terms of the settlement
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agreement. See Perry, 134 Idaho at 50, 995 P.2d at 820. The trial court allowed mention of the
agreement only during cross-examination of the husband but did not allow disclosure of the
amount of settlement. See id. at 57, 995 P.2d at 827. In affirming the trial court's decision, this
Court recognized that "[ d]eciding whether a settlement agreement should be disclosed to a jury
rests in the broad discretion of the trial court." See id. (emphasis added). This Court then held
that the trial court properly exercised its discretion by carefully limiting the fact of settlement to
bias and impeachment. See id.
Contrary to Aspen's argument, Perry does not support an abuse of discretion by the trial
court in denying admission of the fact of settlement in this case. First, Perry recognizes that the
admission of the fact of settlement is left to the broad discretion of the trial judge and will not be
overturned without a clear showing of abuse. See id. at 57, 995 P.2d at 827. Secondly, unlike
Perry, there is no evidence of a pattern of hostilities between Aspen and Dr. Moore that is in any

way similar to the acrimonious divorce and child custody conflict between the parties in Perry,
nor is there any allegation that Dr. Moore's testimony was "extremely unfavorable" to Aspen. In
fact, Aspen's trial counsel submitted an affidavit to the trial court which admitted that Dr.
Moore's disclosed expert testimony was only indirectly adverse to Aspen. R. 533, 1 5.
Having previously admitted that Dr. Moore's testimony was only "indirectly adverse" to
it, Aspen shifts to a claim that "Dr. Moore's decision to step outside of his role as a treating
provider opened the door and placed Dr. Moore's own personal reasons for wanting to shift
blame to Aspen directly at issue." See Appellant's Brief, p. 70. However, all Aspen can point to
as evidence of bias by Dr. Moore is that Dr. Moore answered a question truthfully.
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Thus,

Aspen's argument is that answering a question truthfully, when that question is harmful to
another party's case, is inherently an act of bias. Such an argument is wholly inconsistent with
the concept of honesty and fairness that underlies our civil court system.
Aspen's own motion to compel disclosure of the settlement agreement focused on the
potential post-trial issue of offset and only offered the issue of bias as a secondary basis. See Tr.,
104:6-14 (Ms. Brown refers to the set-off issue as the "more significant issue"). Within that
hearing, Aspen had a full and fair opportunity to make its case to the trial court as to how Dr.
Moore's testimony about what he would have done showed bias against Aspen. The trial court
specifically asked Aspen's counsel "[b]ased on the representations as to what he will testify,
what element of impeachment is there in the agreement?" Tr., 121 :10-12. In response, Aspen's
counsel stated that they didn't know. Tr., 121: 13-15. Thus, when given a chance to tell the trial
court exactly how Dr. Moore's testimony demonstrated bias towards Aspen, Aspen's counsel
was unable to provide an answer.
When Aspen again raised the issue prior to cross-examination of Dr. Moore at trial, it
again could not provide any specific or concrete reason as to why Dr. Moore's testimony
suggested bias against Aspen. Rather, Aspen's concern was impeaching Dr. Moore's
competency as a physician as a way to attack his credibility. Aspen's trial counsel argued that
"Dr. Moore is testifying not only that he - he really is testifying, essentially, that he complied
with the standard of care. And I think that's inconsistent with the fact he would settle." Tr.,
727:3-8.

Thus, Aspen's concern was not any alleged bias by Dr. Moore against Aspen, but on

impeaching his credibility as a physician.
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The trial court then asked Aspen's trial counsel, "[o]ther than the settlement itself, can
you define for me the areas of impeachment you intend to pursue?" Tr., 728:16-18. In response,
Aspen did not mention any bias by Dr. Moore. Tr., 728:19 - 729:20. After argument from Mrs.
Brauner's counsel, the trial court stated, "[w]hat I was looking for in my inquiry was if there
were elements of bias that were going to be developed that would make this clear that this might
be a tipping point on credibility. I haven't heard that." Tr., 732:17-25 (emphasis added). Thus,
the trial court gave Aspen every opportunity to identify some bias by Dr. Moore that might
support the admission of the fact of settlement and Aspen utterly failed to do so. The trial court
then denied the motion. Tr., 4-5.
The record above reflects that the trial court heard Aspen's arguments about why they
should be allowed to disclose the fact of settlement, recognized that the fact of settlement did not
reflect any bias by Dr. Moore, that Dr. Moore's testimony was to causation, not standard of care,
and properly exercised his broad discretion to exclude the fact of settlement from the jury. 14
On appeal, Aspen again argues that Dr. Moore's testimony was subject to impeachment
because his credibility regarding his own care was central to his credibility as a witness.
However, Aspen spent significant time cross-examining Dr. Moore on his failure to identify the
fracture on March 3rd . Tr., 737-738; 740-745. Aspen also called its own orthopedic expert to
testify as to the visibility of the fracture on the March 3, 2014 x-ray and he was even allowed to
14

Aspen also asserts that the trial court did not appreciate the distinction between admission of
the specific terms of the settlement agreement and the more general admission of the fact of
settlement. However, nothing in the record supports this claim of error by the trial court. The
clear context of the oral argument before the trial court prior to Dr. Moore's cross-examination
was about allowing the fact of settlement to be disclosed to the jury. Tr., 725-733.
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comment on other problems in the x-ray, as well as imply that Dr. Moore should have known
Mrs. Brauner was not progressing well at Aspen. Tr., 1180-1183; Tr., 1185 :4-22. In fact, Dr.
Kristensen's testimony went so far into criticizing Dr. Moore that the trial court was concerned
he would have to address the issue in instructions to the jury. Tr., 1190:14-23. The trial court
warned Aspen's counsel that he was treading on the issue that should not be a part of this case.
Tr., 1193 :9-10.

The cross-examination of Dr. Moore and the testimony of Dr. Kristensen

demonstrate that Aspen was provided a more than fair opportunity to impeach Dr. Moore's
15
credibility by contradicting his implied compliance with the standard of care.

Lastly, Aspen argues that the trial court ignored the "significant record evidence" of bias
against Aspen by Dr. Moore. In support of this, Aspen first asserts that Mrs. Brauner's counsel
and Dr. Moore's counsel were "evasive" about the existence of a final settlement agreement and
this indicates bias against Aspen by Dr. Moore.

Mrs. Brauner vehemently objects to the

accusation that there was any evasiveness regarding a settlement between Dr. Moore and Mrs.
Brauner. 16 More importantly, Aspen makes no attempt to explain why this shows bias by Dr.

15

Aspen also claims Dr. Moore changed his testimony at trial by admitting in discovery that the
fracture was present on the March 3, 2014 x-ray, then saying he wasn't sure if it was or not at
trial. See Appellant's Brief, p. 71. This is a complete misconstruction of Dr. Moore's testimony.
He testified the fracture was present on the x-ray, but also testified that he was not sure if it was
visible on the monitor he used when he reviewed the films. Tr., 740-741.
16
Aspen's claims of "evasiveness" are based solely on the fact that while a verbal settlement was
reached in late October of 2017, the final settlement agreement was not signed until early
January and Dr. Moore was not dismissed until late January. The simple explanation is that it
took time to finalize the written settlement agreement because of the need to address a possible
Medicare set-aside and the dismissal was not filed until Mrs. Brauner's counsel had received the
settlement funds. R. 1481-83 (Affidavit of Kevin Scanlan); 1489-1492 (Affidavit of Eric S.
Rossman). The email from Kevin Scanlan's office to Aspen's trial counsel is entirely consistent
with the fact that a settlement had been reached, but not finalized in a written agreement as of
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Moore against Aspen in such a way that would influence his testimony regarding what he would
have done if called by Aspen's nurses. Nor does it explain why, if this was significant record
evidence of bias by Dr. Moore, it was never mentioned to the trial court as proof of Dr. Moore's
bias.
Aspen's only other source of alleged bias by Dr. Moore is that Dr. Moore "willingly"
answered a question posed to his counsel by Mrs. Brauner's counsel and that the settlement
occurred in close proximity in time to the Expert Witness Disclosure. See Appellant's Brief, p.
73. Again, Aspen fails to provide any citation to the record that indicates that Aspen informed
the trial com1 it believed Dr. Moore was biased based on these facts. Aspen was well aware at
the February 9, 2018 hearing and at trial during Dr. Moore's testimony, that Dr. Moore and Mrs.
Brauner had reached some kind of settlement in late October, 2017, that Dr. Moore had been
disclosed as a non-retained expert witness on November 9, 2017. At no time did Aspen claim
these facts supported any claim of bias by Dr. Moore.
Aspen now focuses on the post-trial proceedings where it was confirmed by Mrs.
Brauner's counsel that he had asked Dr. Moore's counsel what Dr. Moore would have done if
contacted by Aspen nurses in the relevant time frame. Aspen says this "leaves no doubt" of Dr.
Moore's bias, but again fails to explain why. See Appellant's Brief, p. 73. Dr. Moore was not
asked if Aspen should have called him, if Aspen's nurses had been negligent, or if Aspen's
conduct caused the amputation. He was asked what he would have done if called. Both vascular

November 30, 2017. R. 2585. There was no evasiveness. There was a settlement in late October,
but no final settlement agreement until early January and the settlement was not completed until
receipt of the funds and dismissal of Dr. Moore on January 24, 2018.
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surgery experts provided the legal causation opinions. Mrs. Brauner's nursing expert provided
the standard of care opinion that Aspen's nurses breached the standard of care by not contacting
Dr. Ludwig or Dr. Moore on March 17, 2014.

Dr. Moore's testimony was crucial factual

17
causation testimony, but it in no way impugned Aspen' s conduct or Aspen's nurses.

Aspen' s argument is simply that any witness who provides any information to a party
without being subpoenaed or compelled is biased against the other party to the litigation and that
all defendants in an action are required to be completely hostile to the plaintiff in order to avoid a
claim of bias. There is no case law which supports this kind of black and white determination of
bias by a witness. Dr. Moore's status as a settled defendant is not sufficient to deem him biased
against Aspen. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 780, 727 P.2d 1187, 1208 (1986).
Lastly, even if Dr. Moore had some understandable desire to shift blame to Aspen at the
beginning of the case when facing a claim of comparative fault by Aspen, it is difficult to
understand how Dr. Moore would continue to have such motivation to testify adversely to Aspen
when he was no longer a defendant and no longer subject to a comparative negligence claim
from Aspen. When Aspen failed to disclose an expert witness to testify against Dr. Moore, it
was clear that Aspen had chosen not to pursue a comparative fault defense as to Dr. Moore.
Thus, as of December 20, 2017, Dr. Moore clearly had absolutely no reason to be biased in any

Aspen also ignores that its own medical director testified to substantially the same critical
causation fact. At trial, Dr. Ludwig testified that, had he been contacted by Aspen's nurses at
3:03 AM on March 16, 2014, he would have told the staff to send Mrs. Brauner to the emergency
room or contact Dr. Moore. Tr., 648:23 - 651: 12. He testified he would have done the same
thing at 3:41 AM on March 17, 2014. Tr., 652:8 - 655:15. It is difficult to fathom how Dr.
Moore's testimony proves his bias against Aspen, but Dr. Ludwig's substantially similar
testimony demonstrates no bias at all .
17
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way against Aspen. This lack of bias is further supported by Dr. Moore's own trial testimony,
upon questions by Aspen's trial counsel, that he referred patients to Aspen "to this day" because
of their high patient satisfaction ratings. Tr., 750:24 - 752:7. 18 Thus, despite asking for - and
receiving - a strong vote of confidence about Aspen's general care of patients from Dr. Moore
during his testimony, Aspen now rails at how biased Dr. Moore was against Aspen in this case.
Aspen concludes by stating "Plaintiffs overall narrative to the jury was that Dr. Moore
was a competent and disinterested physician who held the opinion that Aspen missed key
symptoms and but for that error Plaintiffs leg would have been saved." See Appellant's Brief, p.
74. Unfortunately for Aspen, Mrs. Brauner never told the jury, or asked Dr. Moore to testify to
the jury, that Aspen missed key symptoms or that missing those symptoms caused the loss of
Mrs. Brauner's leg. Rather, it was Mrs. Brauner's retained nursing expert who testified that
Aspen's nurses failed to properly communicate Mrs. Brauner's rapidly deteriorating condition to
her physicians. See Statement of Facts, supra. It was Mrs. Brauner's retained expert vascular
surgeon, as well as Aspen's vascular surgeon, who testified that the failure to transfer Mrs.
Brauner to the emergency room earlier was a substantial factor in causing the loss of her leg. See
id. Dr. Moore simply testified that, based on the symptoms in the nurses notes for March 16 and

March 17 of 2014, had he been contacted he would have sent Mrs. Brauner to the emergency
room. While Dr. Moore's testimony, and Dr. Ludwig's similar testimony, provided the link
between the failure to contact the physicians and the cause of the amputation, neither Dr. Moore
nor Dr. Ludwig testified to any breach of the standard of care by Aspen's nurses or to whether
In fact, Aspen's trial counsel emphasized this testimony by Dr. Moore in his closing argument
as evidence of Aspen's justifiable pride in its quality of service. Tr., 1623:3-7.
18
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any such breach caused Mrs. Brauner's injuries. Thus, Aspen's whole argument for Dr. Moore's
bias is based on subjects on which Dr. Moore never testified.
The record set forth in this case clearly demonstrates there is no evidence of any bias by
Dr. Moore against Aspen and, further, the trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in
refusing to allow Aspen to disclose Dr. Moore's settlement with Mrs. Brauner during crossexamination in this matter.
E.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Aspen's Rule 60(b)(3) Motion.

On March 30, 2018, Aspen filed a Rule 60(b)(3) Motion seeking relief from judgment
based on alleged fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation by Mrs. Brauner' s counsel. The entire
basis for Aspen's motion was an unsupported and, indeed unsupportable, conspiracy theory
which conjured up a secret, unwritten, "quid pro quo" agreement between Dr. Moore and Mrs.
Brauner regarding Dr. Moore's testimony at trial.
In response, Mrs. Brauner filed a Memorandum in Opposition, the Declaration of Richard
Moore, M.D., and the Affidavits of Eric S. Rossman and Kevin Scanlan. The Affidavits and
Declaration conclusively established there was absolutely no agreement made regarding Dr.
Moore's testimony. R. 1516-1518; 1487-94; 1480-85. In reality, Aspen's motion and appeal are
nothing more than a desperate attempt to avoid the consequences of its own decisions and
mistakes in the manner it chose to defend and litigate this case. Because Aspen's motion failed
to even begin to meet the standard necessary for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3), the
trial court properly denied the motion and such decision must be affirmed on this appeal.
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1.

Legal Standards Applicable to Rule 60(b)(3) motions.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b )(3) provides that "on motion and just terms, the court
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following

reasons

...

(3)

fraud

(whether previously called

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party."

intrinsic

or extrinsic),

Under Idaho law, such fraud,

misrepresentation, or misconduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and must
have prevented the party from fully and fairly presenting its case. See Tyler v. Keeney, 128
Idaho 524, 528, 915 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore, "[f]or the purposes of
subdivision (3) of the rule, fraud will be found only in the presence of such tampering with the
administration of justice as to suggest a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and
safeguard the public." Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) (quoting Win.

of Mich., Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754, 53 P.3d 330,337 (2002)).
This Court has clearly held that fraud, for the purposes of Rule 60(b )(3 ), requires more
than interparty misconduct. See Artiach Trucking v. Walters, 118 Idaho 656, 658, 798 P.2d 938,
940 (Ct. App. 1990). Indeed, this Court has held that even false statements in affidavits used to
obtain default judgments are insufficient to provide relief under Rule 60(b )(3) because "[n]one of
those statements, even if false, constitute such tampering with the administration of justice as to
suggest a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public." See Suitts,
141 Idaho at 709, 117 P.3d at 123.
Thus, under established Idaho authority, a Rule 60(b)(3) motion based on fraud must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence, must have prevented the party from fully and fairly
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presenting its case, and must constitute tampering with the administration of justice so as to
19
The
suggest a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public."

decision to grant or deny relief pursuant to a motion under Rule 60 is within the discretion of the
trial court and, absent a manifest abuse of that discretion, such decision will not be overturned on
appeal. See Win. ofMich., Inc. 137 Idaho at 753, 53 P.3d at 336.
Aspen cites to numerous non-Idaho authorities for the legal standards applicable to
misrepresentation or misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3).

These authorities indicate that the

misrepresentation or misconduct can be inadvertent, careless, accidental or even innocent and
still provide a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(3). However, where the moving party was in
possession of facts which put it on notice that additional information might be available through
normal discovery procedures or where the moving party failed to request, formally or informally,
supplementation of discovery responses where it had knowledge of facts that provided notice
that the information in the original discovery responses may have changed, no relief will be
granted.

See Artiach,118 Idaho 658-59, 798 P.2d at 940-941.

Thus, contrary to Aspen's

assertion, not all alleged discovery violations are the basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) and, in
fact, courts have consistently held that a Rule 60(b)(3) motion is not a substitute for normal pre-

Aspen asserts that this Court did not really mean that fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) requires
something beyond interparty misconduct and must be something that arises to tampering with the
administration of justice. However, the only support for this assertion is a citation to a Court of
Appeals case and reliance on federal case law. As is set forth above, the Idaho Supreme Court
has consistently stated that fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) requires the kind of conduct that arises to
the level of tampering with the administration of justice and is more than mere interparty
misconduct. This well-established precedent is binding upon Aspen and it is not "manifestly
wrong" such as to require this Court to overrule this prior precedent simply because it is a
different standard than that applied by the federal courts.
19
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trial discovery remedies. See, e.g., LG Elecs. US.A. , Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d
541, 569 (D. Del. 2011) (whether alleged discovery misconduct warrants relief under Rule
60(b)(3) "requires not only consideration of the request propounded, but also the response by
one's adversary, and whether the moving party resorted to a motion to compel or a request for
sanctions as permitted by the federal rules."); Floorgraphics Inc. v. News Am. Marketing In-

Store Servs., Inc., 434 Fed.Appx. 109, 112, 2011 WL 1486558, at *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 20, 2011)
(denying Rule 60(b)(3) motion where non-moving party objected to a discovery request and
failed to produce documents and moving party never moved to compel production or seek
sanctions).
Finally, no claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) can be granted unless the alleged fraud,
misrepresentation or misconduct substantially interfered with the aggrieved party's ability to
fully and fairly prepare for or proceed at trial. Ojeda- Toro v. Rivera-Mendez, 853 F.2d 25, 29
(1st Cir.1988) (Misconduct can have the effect of substantially interfering with the full and fair
presentation of the case only when a party did not have knowledge of the alleged inaccuracies or
access to information which could have resulted in this knowledge at the time of the alleged
misconduct.). As with the other elements, this element of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion must also be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
2.

There was no Abuse of Discretion by the Trial Court in Denying the
Rule 60(b)(3) Motion.

Aspen appeals the trial court's decision denying the Rule 60(b)(3) motion and argues that
although the trial court stated it intended to issue a written opinion, it did not and, therefore, the
trial court abused its discretion by ruling from the bench, without sufficient analysis and "in light
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of paucity of the Trial Court's analysis, and the clear and convincing evidence of misconduct in
the record, reversal is proper."

See Appellant's Brief, p. 76.

However, as is clear in the

transcript of the July 11, 2018 hearing, the trial court never expressed an intention to submit a
written opinion. Rather the trial court stated "[t]o protect the record in this case, the wisest thing
for me to do would be to defer, to write opinion, cite the cases, and acknowledge them. I am not
going to - I'm going to announce a decision at this time." July 11, 2018 hearing transcript, p.
101, LL 13-17.
Additionally, the trial court did engage in analysis throughout the oral argument on the
Rule 60(b)(3) motion and in announcing the decision. The trial court asked Aspen's counsel
about the significance of Dr. Moore's testimony and the alleged lack of disclosure that Dr.
Moore had answered a question for Mrs. Brauner's counsel and then allowed Mrs. Brauner's
counsel to address that as well. See July 11th Transcript, p. 86, line 5 - p. 99, line 19. The trial
court then specifically held that based on the affidavits and declaration he "would have to take
inference based on inference to conclude he was acting for reasons other than what he represents
and what counsel represents." July 11 th Transcript, p. 101, LL 22-25. The trial court expressly
found that there was a "fair opportunity to confront witnesses, to examine, to cross examine. We
had a fair jury. We had a process which overarching was a fair process. And the jury had the
facts and had extended testimony. To say that all that effort was a waste of time and to start over
would be an injustice, not a justice." July 11 th Transcript, p. 101, LL 3-10.
Aspen has made no attempt on appeal to explain why this very clear decision from the
trial judge constituted an abuse of discretion. Rather, Aspen says that the "paucity of analysis"
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and the "clear and convincing evidence" requires a reversal. However, it is very clear from the
statements of the trial court that he refused to infer bias by Dr. Moore based on nothing more
than Dr. Moore's testimony that was not in Aspen's favor.

It is clear that the trial court

understood that Aspen had a full and fair opportunity to confront Dr. Moore and to crossexamine Dr. Moore. Most importantly, the trial court recognized that the trial was a fair trial and
that overturning the verdict would be an injustice

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides

that no verdict can be set aside or overturned unless the alleged error by the court or a party
affected another party's substantial rights. The trial court's statements in denying Aspen's Rule
60(b)(3) motion clearly demonstrate that the trial court, who heard all of the evidence and
arguments, did not believe that Aspen had been denied any substantial right in trying its case. As
such, the trial court's oral ruling from the bench is more than sufficient to demonstrate his
decision was not an abuse of discretion.
a.

There was no quid pro quo agreement between Mrs. Brauner and
Dr. Moore.

Aspen asserts that the trial court's determination that there was no quid pro quo
agreement "defies credibility" because the November 9, 2017 Amended Disclosure and January
9, 2018 Rebuttal Disclosure were contemporaneous with the oral settlement agreement and
execution of the written agreement. That is the sum of the clear and convincing evidence Aspen
relies upon. Despite sworn testimony from two attorneys and the testifying physician that there
was no such agreement, Aspen asserts the timing is clear and convincing evidence they are all
lying. As is set forth in Eric Rossman's affidavit, the timing is a result of litigation strategy and
one which he has used before. See R. 1487, ilil 3-4. Furthermore, both Mr. Rossman and Mr.
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Scanlan offered sworn affidavit testimony that there was no attempt to hide the settlement or
obfuscate the process of finalizing the agreement. See R. 1480-85; 1487-1494.
The crux of Aspen's argument, at least after it received the affidavits and declarations, is
that because Mrs. Brauner failed to supplement discovery responses to disclose the
communication between Dr. Moore's counsel and Mrs. Brauner's counsel regarding what Dr.
Moore would have done had he been called by Aspen's nurses, there was an intentional or
negligent concealment of this fact. However, the only Interrogatory that Aspen has identified as
asking for any "statements" from the parties, is an Interrogatory from Dr. Moore. R. 2295.
While Mrs. Brauner acknowledges that she answered "no" to this question, even if the answer
was technically incorrect, the answer is harmless because Mr. Scanlan certainly knew the
conversation had occurred. Aspen has cited to no authority that it has standing to now claim
fraud or misconduct about any alleged deficiencies in Mrs. Brauner's discovery responses to Dr.
Moore. See Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 510 (9 th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant
lacked standing to compel a response to a codefendant's discovery request). Additionally, Mr.
Rossman's question to Dr. Moore, through counsel, was protected work product as it necessarily
included the mental impressions, conclusions, and/or legal theories of counsel regarding
litigation of the case against Aspen. See IRCP 26(b)(3)(b ).
Aspen has cited to discovery requests generated by it that asked for persons with
knowledge, physicians consulted, and expert opinions. Even if the discussion between Mr.
Rossman and Mr. Scanlan was somehow responsive to one or more of Aspen's discovery
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requests, 20 Aspen knew about Dr. Moore's expected testimony as of November 9, 2017. If
Aspen believed Mr. Rossman was making that testimony up, they could have sent additional
discovery to explore that issue, asked Dr. Moore about it at his deposition, or filed a motion to
exclude Dr. Moore's testimony with the trial court. Aspen did nothing at any time to explore
how Mr. Rossman learned of Dr. Moore's expected testimony. Aspen cannot claim misconduct
or fraud by Mrs. Brauner's counsel when, having been put on notice by the Amended Disclosure,
Aspen did absolutely nothing to explore the issue. See Babinec v. Yabuki, 799 P.2d 1325, 1328
(Alaska 1990) (denying Rule 60(b )(3) motion where defendant made a tactical decision not to
pursue a known discovery issue before trial); Armstrong v. The Cadle Co., 239 F.R.D. 688, 695
(S.D. Fla. 2007) ("A party cannot successfully bring a Rule 60(b)(3) motion where the 'pursuit
of the truth was [not] hampered by anything except [the movant's] own reluctance to undertake
an assiduous investigation."').
In fact, Aspen deposed Dr. Moore on January 18, 2018, and chose not to explore any of
those issues related to Dr. Moore's review of medical records produced in litigation, whether the
settlement was conditioned upon any agreements regarding his testimony, the foundation of Dr.

Mrs. Brauner does not believe the conversation was responsive to the discovery requests cited
in the Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-7. Aspen's Interrogatories asked for persons with knowledge, and
physicians consulted regarding her injuries or with whom she had consulted since 2010. See id.
Mrs. Brauner identified Dr. Moore in her answers. See id. None of the interrogatories asked
about communications between Mrs. Brauner and/or her counsel and Dr. Moore and/or his
counsel, or asked about any communications or statements at all. See R. 1635-1638. The
discovery requests related to experts were supplemented with Dr. Moore's Amended Disclosure
and if Aspen felt that was not adequate supplementation, it should have brought a motion to
exclude. See, e.g., Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 1002, 367 P.3d 1214, 1224 (2016).
More importantly, the discovery asks for the opinions and basis for such opinions, not for
communications between counsel or between Dr. Moore and Mrs. Brauner's counsel. R. 1637.
20
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Moore's opinion, where and when he had received and reviewed Aspen's nursing notes, or why
he had provided an opinion to Mrs. Brauner's counsel. See generally, R. 2092-2238. Aspen
cannot claim it was denied an opportunity to fully explore Dr. Moore's opinions, how those
opinions were formed, how they were communicated to Mr. Rossman, and whether Dr. Moore
had any bias towards Aspen when it chose not to explore any of those topics in his deposition.
Aspen also attempts to rely on statements made by Plaintiff's counsel as clear and
convincing evidence of misconduct. Aspen asserts that because Mr. Rossman repeatedly argued
that there was no evidence to show any bias by Dr. Moore against Aspen, he made material
misrepresentations to the trial court because he knew that Dr. Moore had "volunteered" to
provide testimony against Aspen.

Again, as was discussed previously, Dr. Moore never

volunteered to provide testimony against Aspen, he answered a question, through counsel, posed
by Mr. Rossman and Aspen was made fully aware of this intended testimony three months
before trial. At the hearing on the Rule 60(b)(3) motion, Mr. Rossman again reiterated that Dr.
Moore was not a voluntary witness and that he was unaware of any reason Dr. Moore would
want to testify against Aspen. July 11 th Transcript, p. 96, line 10 - p. 97, line 18.
Similarly, Aspen asserts that Mrs. Brauner's counsel misrepresented the voluntariness of
Moore's trial testimony by telling the Court that Moore was not testifying voluntarily and was, in
fact, testifying pursuant to subpoena.

Aspen asserts this is false because there was a

conversation at Dr. Moore's deposition regarding Dr. Moore testifying at trial in which Dr.
Moore indicated he would make himself available and Dr. Moore's counsel indicated a subpoena
wasn't required "at this point .... " See R. 2237, line 10 - p. 2238, line 11. First, as Aspen
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admits, a subpoena was issued to Dr. Moore the day before the hearing on the motion to compel
and, therefore, Plaintiffs counsel's statement was entirely correct. The fact that Dr. Moore
indicated a willingness to make himself available for trial testimony, does not mean that he was
voluntarily testifying to support the Plaintiff. It simply means that, for the benefit of his practice,
it was better to try and coordinate a date than wait to be subpoenaed at a time solely convenient
to Plaintiff. Plaintiffs counsel made similar efforts with Dr. Ludwig's counsel and also issued a
subpoena to Dr. Ludwig. See R. 1511-1512. Aspen has never asserted that its own medical
director was a voluntary and willing witness for Mrs. Brauner, despite receiving the same
consideration of his schedule as was given to Dr. Moore before the issuance of the subpoena.
Aspen also assets that Mr. Rossman made misrepresentations to the Court at that hearing
regarding the intended content of Dr. Moore's testimony by stating that Dr. Moore was not going
to offer opinions against Aspen regarding Aspen' s breach of the standard of care. Aspen asserts
that the standard of care opinion referenced in the Amended Disclosure was an opinion as to the
standard of care for the Aspen nurses. See Appellant 's Brief, pp. 80-81. Aspen claims that Mrs.
Brauner's counsel had no reason to be afraid of asking Dr. Moore that question because he knew
the answer in November of 2017. See id. However, the transcript clearly demonstrated that Mr.
Rossman was clarifying that Dr. Moore's standard of care opinion was for an orthopedic
surgeon, not Aspen nurses. Tr., 124: 10-24. Mr. Rossman's clarification to the Court was not a
misrepresentation in any way.
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b.

Aspen was not denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate its case.

Finally, Aspen asserts that the alleged fraud, misrepresentation and/or misconduct denied
it a full and fair opportunity to present its defense because "Aspen was prevented from fully
litigating its arguments regarding bias and the admissibility of Dr. Moore's opinions as a nonretained expert."

See Appellant's Brief, p. 82.

While Aspen's allegations of fraud,

misrepresentation or misconduct are wholly unsupported by the facts of the case, Aspen's
allegation of a denial of a full and fair opportunity to litigate its defense, is simply devoid of any
substance. First, the only reasonable conclusion is that Aspen is alleging that Dr. Moore testified
falsely and that, in the absence of bias and/or the alleged quid pro quo agreement, Dr. Moore
would have testified that he would not have sent Mrs. Brauner to the ER at the relevant point in
time. This conclusion is completely unsupported by any evidence in the record. Aspen offered
no testimony at trial, or anywhere in this litigation, that the standard of care for orthopedic
surgeons would have required something other than ordering that Mrs. Brauner be immediately
transferred to the emergency room or that Dr. Moore personally would not actually have done so.
Furthermore, Aspen ignores that Dr. Ludwig, Aspen's own medical director and hardly a willing
witness for the Plaintiff, also testified that he would have called Dr. Moore or sent Mrs. Brauner
to the emergency room had he been contacted. Tr., 646-655. There is simply not a single shred
of evidence that Dr. Moore was not truthful in his testimony.
Aspen has cited no case law, nor has Mrs. Brauner found any, to support a Rule 60(b)(3)
motion where there is no evidence or even inference that the testimony was untruthful. In fact,
the only cases Mrs. Brauner has found which come close to addressing this issue are situations
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where evidence is later discovered which supported a claim that the witness was actually
untruthful, not just biased. See, e.g., Ebersole v. Kline-Perry, 292 F.R.D. 316, 319 (E. D. Va.
2013); Stidiron v. Stidiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206 (3d. Cir. 1983); Rembrandt Vision Technologies,
L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., 818 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Where, as

here, there is absolutely no evidence of any kind that Dr. Moore testified untruthfully, it cannot
be reasonably argued that Aspen was denied a full and fair opportunity to present its defense.
The trial court clearly recognized this fact in denying Aspen's motion. July 11 th Transcript, p.
101, LL 1-10.
More importantly, the procedural history of this case demonstrates that not only was
Aspen not denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate its defense, it was given a full and fair
opportunity to litigate Dr. Moore's alleged bias and the alleged existence of a secret quid pro quo
agreement. As was discussed previously at pages 43-44 of this Brief, numerous courts have held
that no Rule 60(b)(3) motion can be granted where the moving party had knowledge of the
alleged inaccuracies or access to information which could have resulted in this knowledge at the
time of the alleged misconduct. See pages 43-44, supra. Aspen's decisions not to pursue an
investigation into how Mr. Rossman knew Dr. Moore's expected testimony, not to question Dr.
Moore about any alleged quid pro quo agreement in his deposition, not to question Dr. Moore
about how and when he formed his opinion set forth in the Amended Disclosure, not to pursue
additional written discovery or demand supplementation of such discovery, and not to present all
of the evidence it now believes is clear and convincing evidence of fraud, misrepresentation
and/or misconduct to the trial court are decisions it must accept.
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As the trial court clearly

recognized, Aspen had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims and defenses in this case,
including any alleged bias by Dr. Moore. Aspen has brought a Rue 60(b)(3) motion full of
accusations, innuendo, and unsupported conspiracy theories but devoid of any factual support
and, perhaps most importantly, devoid of any explanation for how or why Dr. Moore was biased
against it.
The simple truth is that Aspen never cared whether Dr. Moore was biased or believed that
he was for that matter. Rather, Aspen desperately wanted to introduce the fact of settlement
and/or the settlement agreement so that the jury would know that Mrs. Brauner had received a
settlement, would infer that Dr. Moore had been negligent, and would improperly consider those
facts in determining Aspen's negligence and awarding damages. The only reason that Aspen
was in this position was because Aspen, for whatever reason, failed to disclose an expert to
testify against Dr. Moore and, therefore, had no basis for putting Dr. Moore on the verdict form
and having his proportional fault determined by the jury. Like the decisions not to pursue
discovery and/or court remedies regarding Dr. Moore's opinions, this decision was a deliberate
choice by Aspen from which it cannot escape the consequences by blaming Mrs. Brauner or her
counsel. There was a fair trial in this matter, with a fair trial court, a fair jury, and a full and fair
opportunity for Aspen to defend itself. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Aspen's 60(b )(3) motion and this Court should affirm that decision.
F.

Mrs. Brauner is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Mrs. Brauner seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho
Appellate Rule 41 because Aspen's appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, and without
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foundation.
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides that in any civil action, the judge may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing paiiy. This Court has interpreted this statute to allow for attorney
fees to the prevailing party on appeal only where the Court "is left with the abiding belief that the
appeal was brought pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."
Athay v. Rich County, 153 Idaho 815, 827, 291 P.3d 1014, 1026 (2012). In this case, each issue
was brought frivolously or without foundation.
As was set forth above, Aspen failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion regai·ding the
admission of Michele Nielsen's testimony.

Aspen also appealed the issue of whether Dr.

Moore's testimony should have been excluded or limited without having preserved that issue for
appellate review. Aspen failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in excluding the fact of
settlement from evidence at trial and, finally, utterly failed to show any abuse of discretion in the
denial of the Rule 60(b)(3) motion. Many of the arguments raised by Aspen are refuted by
Aspen's own conduct in the litigation of this case and Aspen repeatedly misstates and
misrepresents statements by Mrs. Brauner's counsel and the trial court despite a clear transcript
setting forth the actual statements made.
Aspen has made repeated accusations of misconduct against Mrs. Brauner's counsel
without any support in the record for such alleged misconduct and has relied on conjecture and
innuendo to disparage counsel and Dr. Moore. Based on this conduct, the Court should find this
appeal to have been brought frivolously and without merit and award attorney fees on appeal to
Mrs. Brauner. See Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 378 P.3d 464 (2016) (granting attorney fees
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on appeal where the appeal presented arguments not properly preserved on appeal and the
respondent was forced to defend against issues that "in good faith [the appellant] should not have
raised."); Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 883, 380 P.3d 681, 696 (2016) (granting attorney
fees on appeal where the appeal was no more than a request to "second-guess the jury and
district court .... "). The sole purpose of this appeal is to delay recovery of her just award.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent Leila Brauner respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the trial court's evidentiary rulings and the denial of the Rule 60(b)(3) motion.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2019.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

Isl Eric S. Rossman
Eric S. Rossman
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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